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Abstract 
The main objective of this project was to determine how a FRP composite structure performs 
compared to a steel structure in regard to fire safety and risk level during an evacuation. More 
specifically the objective was to study how the differences in the thermal properties influence 
the smoke layer height, visibility and the temperature of the gases in the early stages of a fire. 
This was done by performing several FDS simulations and analyzing the results from these. In 
order to evaluate the difference in risk level, the time until critical conditions occurred was 
compared between the FRP and steel cases. The results showed small differences in time until 
critical conditions for the smoke layer height and visibility while the temperatures also showed 
only slight differences near the fire but larger differences further away and as time went by. This 
led to the conclusions that there is a difference in risk level based on the reasoning that time 
until critical conditions further away also matter. However, additional research is needed in 
order to determine if the difference is significant or not. 
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Sammanfattning 
Användning av lättviktsmaterial inom den marina sektorn är ett forskningsområde som har blivit 
alltmer intressant sedan hållbar utveckling blivit en allt viktigare fråga. Genom användning av lättare 
konstruktionsmaterial såsom kompositmaterial av fiberförstärkt plast (FRP) kan den totala vikten 
signifikant reduceras vilket leder till ett minskat behov av drivmedel. Således kan man uppnå både 
ekonomiska vinster och minskad miljöpåverkan. Dock finns det några praktiska problem med att 
använda kompositmaterial av FRP på större passagerar-fartyg. Dessa hinder utgörs i huvudsak av den 
befintliga regleringen och brandriskerna som kan uppkomma vid användning av sådana material. Det 
finns också en stark tradition av att använda stålkonstruktioner på fartyg och faktumet att FRP är 
brännbart, till skillnad från stål, gör att det krävs en större mängd brandisolering för att FRP ska uppnå 
samma funktionskrav som stål. 
Målet med detta projekt var att undersöka om den ökade mängden isolering som används i FRP fallet 
har några effekter på risken under utrymningsförloppet. Detta gjordes genom att jämföra hur en 
kompositkonstruktion av FRP påverkar utrymningsförhållandena jämfört med en stål-konstruktion. 
För att uppnå detta mål togs två specifika frågeställningar fram: 
 Hur påverkar en brand-isolerad kompositkonstruktion av FRP brandgaslagerhöjd, siktbarhet 
och brandgasernas temperatur i det tidiga brandförloppet? 
 Bidrar den tillagda isoleringen till en högre risknivå under tiden då utrymning sker? 
Riskanalysen utgick från resultat framtagna från FDS-simuleringar som gjordes för en specifik 
geometri. Denna geometri var enkel och representerade en öppen korridor med passagerarkabiner på 
varje sida i en överbyggnad på ett passagerar-fartyg. Överbyggnadens bärande delar konstruerades i 
två olika byggnadsmaterial – FRP och stål. 
I riskanalysen ingick fyra olika brandscenarion. Dessa var följande: 
 Geometrin utgörs av kompositkonstruktion av FRP och sprinkler aktiverar. 
 Geometrin utgörs av stål och sprinkler aktiverar. 
 Geometrin utgörs av kompositkonstruktion av FRP och sprinkler aktiverar inte. 
 Geometrin utgörs av stål och sprinkler aktiverar inte. 
Temperaturer, siktbarhet och brandgaslagerhöjd studerades för varje simulering och kriterier för dessa 
variabler användes för att bestämma tiden till kritiska förhållande för varje scenario. Kritiska 
förhållande antogs uppstå när det uppstår kritiska förhållande utanför de till brandrummet intilliggande 
kabinerna. Detta innebär således att kritiska förhållanden antogs uppstå när förhållandena påverkar 
utrymningen för människor i de intilliggande kabinerna. Resultaten visades bland annat i diagram som 
visade hur stor del av korridoren som hade kritiska förhållanden för olika tider. Resultaten påvisade 
små skillnader i tid till kritiska förhållanden för brandgaslagerhöjden och siktbarheten. För 
temperaturerna påvisades bara små skillnader i tid till kritiska förhållanden nära branden, men större 
skillnader längre bort från branden och desto längre tiden gick. Detta ledde till slutsatsen att det finns 
en skillnad i risknivå vilket baseras på att även kritiska förhållanden längre bort från branden också 
inverkar på utrymningssäkerheten. Dock krävs det ytterligare forskning för att bestämma om dessa 
skillnader är signifikanta eller ej. 
Känslighetsanalyser som gjordes på parametrar i indata visade att den viktigaste parametern för 
skillnad i risknivå mellan fallen med FRP och stål är tillväxthastigheten, vilken också ligger till grund 
för metoden i hur den ökade brandisoleringen modellerades för i FDS för FRP-fallet.  
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Summary 
The use of lightweight materials in the maritime sector is a field of research that is of great interest 
since sustainability has become a more important issue. With use of lighter construction materials, 
such as fiber-reinforced polymer (FRP) composites, the total weight of a ship can be significantly 
reduced, potentially resulting in fuel savings. This will benefit financial profits as well as the 
environment. There are however some practical problems with the implementation of FRP composite 
structures on larger passenger ships, mainly in regard to fire safety risks and the current legislation. 
This complicates the transition from the use of steel which is traditionally the material of choice. The 
fact that FRP is combustible, unlike steel, demands the use of additional thermal insulation.   
The aim of this project was to identify if the added insulation used in the FRP case has any effects on 
the risks regarding fire safety during an evacuation. This was done by comparing the performance of a 
FRP composite structure with that of a steel structure. To fulfill this objective two specific research 
questions were formulated and answered: 
 How does an insulated FRP composite structure influence the smoke layer height, visibility 
and gas temperature in the early stages of a fire?  
 Does the added insulation result in a higher risk level during evacuation time frame? 
The risk analysis consisted of analysis from results of conducted FDS simulations for a specific 
geometry representing an accommodation area in a passenger ship superstructure. The decks and 
bulkheads of this superstructure were constructed using two different building materials, FRP 
composite and steel. More precisely the model represented a corridor with passenger cabins on both 
sides, the fire was assumed to start in one of these cabins where the door had been left open. 
Four different scenarios were part of the risk analysis. The scenarios were as follows: 
1. A FRP composite structure is used and sprinkler activation takes place. 
2. A steel structure is used and sprinkler activation takes place. 
3. A FRP composite structure is used and no sprinkler activation takes place. 
4. A steel structure is used and no sprinkler activation takes place. 
The temperatures, visibilities and smoke layer heights were studied for each simulation and criteria for 
these variables were used to determine the time until critical conditions for each scenario. Critical 
conditions were assumed to occur when people in the cabins adjacent to the fire room could be 
exposed to critical conditions. The results were, among other ways, presented in charts which for 
different times show a fraction that represents the amount of corridor area where critical conditions 
have occurred. The results showed small differences in time until critical conditions for the smoke 
layer height and visibility while the temperatures also showed only slight differences near the fire but 
larger differences further away and as time went by. This led to the conclusions that there is a 
difference in risk level based on the reasoning that time until critical conditions further away also 
matter. However, additional research is needed in order to determine if the difference is significant or 
not. 
Sensitivity analyses of input parameters were also performed and showed that the most important 
parameter for the differences in risk level between the FRP and steel case is the fire growth rate, which 
also is a founding parameter in the methodology used for modeling the additional thermal insulation in 
the FRP case. 
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1 Introduction 
In the maritime sector steel has out of tradition become the material of choice when constructing large 
ships. From a fire safety and risk perspective this is beneficial since steel is a non-combustible 
material. However with increasing world population and decreasing energy resources the demands on 
the transport sector has become more severe concerning sustainability and effectiveness. This has led 
to increasing research and development of lightweight constructions where materials such as fiber-
reinforced polymer (FRP) are used. The problem is that the materials used in these structures are not 
approved by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS convention), which is 
published by International Maritime Organization (IMO) and is considered to be the main 
international standard for ship construction.  
1.1 Background 
For more than a decade parts of the maritime sector have been interested in research concerning 
whether or not it is possible to use lightweight materials on ships in order to make them lighter and 
thereby more environmentally friendly. Of course the possibility of more cost effective solutions has 
also been a motive that has led to the involvement and economic investments of actors. A project that 
deals with this was requested by VINNOVA which is a Swedish government-owned agency funding 
innovation and sustainable development. The project has made it evident that there is an interest in the 
development and that the field could have a promising future (Hertzberg et al., 2009). In total 29 
different actors, both organizations within the maritime sector as well as research institutes have 
joined and contributed to this project group which formed in 2004 under the name Lightweight 
Applications at Sea, LASS. This group has developed into a non-profit organization working for 
acquiring and spreading knowledge about lightweight materials in the maritime sector. The 
organization aims to increase funding of research by formulating common issues that actors in the 
maritime sector have regarding lightweight materials. The group also strives for international 
cooperation within the research area (S-LÄSS, 2014).  
There are however some obstacles other than the technical ones that have to be tackled in order to 
begin using lightweight materials. First of all, the maritime sector is conservative, and in order for new 
techniques to be used, they all have to be thoroughly tested, which in the traditional way is best done 
by long-time usage. Secondly, the regulation that governs ship construction is today decided by every 
specific flag state as well as by international organizations such as IMO. Most regulations are based on 
SOLAS convention which is the prescriptive code for ship construction that IMO has developed. 
Recently, the code was changed and this has made it possible to use constructions in other materials 
than just steel or non-combustible materials as long as they can be shown to be just as safe as the 
conventional structures. This is where the next problem is encountered; there are no specific reference 
points, like acceptance criteria for safe evacuation used in the building codes on land, that make it 
possible to use analytical design methods instead of prescriptive rules. Thus, a new design has to be 
proven equal to steel regarding fire safety which calls for methods that compare the new design to the 
prescriptive rules (Hertzberg et al., 2009). 
The LASS project has shown that, in some applications, it may be possible to use FRP. During the 
project an FRP composite structure was tested according to standards for testing maritime materials. 
The material tested consisted of two laminates of fiber-reinforced polymer with a core of PVC foam. 
The problem with this material is that it is combustible and that it can soften at temperatures as low as 
100
°
C. To overcome this issue the researchers used fire insulation and the LASS group showed that 
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the material can endure a full scale furnace fire test for 60 minutes. This is the same fire test that 
materials must pass to comply with the perspective requirements and it can thus be argued that the 
FRP composite fulfills the requirements regarding insulation and integrity even if the materials used 
are combustible (Hertzberg et al., 2009). 
1.1.1 Alternative fire safety designs 
The previously mentioned fire safety regulation that concerns alternative designs is SOLAS II-2/17. 
The regulation states that any designs that deviate from the prescriptive requirements must fulfill the 
functional requirements in order to make sure that the fire safety objectives of SOLAS are met.  There 
are five fire safety objectives and eight functional requirements listed in SOLAS II-2/2. The fire safety 
objectives cited from SOLAS are as follows (IMO, 2004): 
“ 
 Prevent the occurrence of fire and explosion 
 Reduce the risk to life caused by fire 
 Reduce the risk of damage caused by fire to the ship, its cargo and the environment 
 Contain, control and suppress fire and explosion in the compartment of origin 
 Provide adequate and readily accessible means of escape for passengers and crew 
“ 
These objectives are very general and leave much room for different interpretations and solutions. 
However the functional requirements, listed below, give slightly more detailed information on what is 
needed to fulfill the objectives (IMO, 2004). 
“ 
 Division the ship into main vertical and horizontal zones by thermal and structural 
boundaries 
 Separation of accommodation spaces from reminder of the ship by thermal and structural 
boundaries 
 Restricted use of combustible materials 
 Detection of any fire in the zone of origin 
 Containment and extinction of any fire in the space of origin 
 Protection of means of escape and access for fire fighting 
 Ready availability of fire-extinguishing appliances 
 Minimization of possibility of ignition of flammable cargo vapor 
“ 
As mentioned above these requirements are also quite non-specific, this can have both positive and 
negative implications from a design perspective. The lack of concrete criteria in form of quantitative 
limits can result in more liberty for the designers but in the end it makes it harder to show that the 
functional requirements have been met.  
The first step that needs to be taken when moving towards approval of an alternative design is, 
according to SOLAS II-2/17, to perform an engineering analysis. The analysis must as minimum 
include the elements listed in the regulation and the objective of this engineering analysis is to show 
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that the functional requirements are met. Some of the components that must be included are 
identification of which of the perspective requirements that the ship will fail to comply with, 
identification of fire hazards of the concerned space and a technical demonstration that shows 
compliance with the functional requirements. This engineering analysis is then evaluated by the 
responsible government body of the particular ships flag state and if it is deemed acceptable it is 
approved for use (IMO, 2004). 
1.2 Aim and objectives 
The aim of the project is to identify some of the possible risks, in regard to fire safety, that are 
introduced when converting from a structure made of steel to the use of FRP onboard large passenger 
ships. This is an important concern that must be dealt with when moving towards approving and 
enabling the use of FRP in the maritime sector. The desire is to assess if the existing level of safety for 
the passengers can be maintained during an evacuation despite the added insulating capabilities of the 
FRP construction. The term risk is in this project defined as the combination of the probability and the 
consequences of a certain scenario. 
More specifically the objective is to study how the differences in the thermal properties influence the 
smoke layer height, visibility and the temperature of the gases in the early stages of a fire. This is done 
in order to compare the risk of using a FRP composite superstructure relative to the more traditional 
steel superstructure. Further the project aims to determine if the effects of the added insulation is a 
factor that should be considered when making the risk level comparison. 
1.3 Research questions 
In order to achieve the objective the following research questions will be answered. 
General 
 How does the insulated FRP composite structure perform compared to the steel structure in 
regard to fire safety and risk during an evacuation?  
Specific 
 How does an insulated FRP composite structure influence the smoke layer height, visibility 
and gas temperature in the early stages of a fire?  
 
 Does the added insulation result in a higher risk level during evacuation time frame? 
1.4 Delimitations 
The aim is not to investigate a total conversion from steel to FRP but rather the superstructure 
exclusively. Hence, the material used in the structures that form the hull, engine rooms and similar 
spaces is steel.  
The aim is not to simulate the evacuation process since this does not change depending on the building 
material. Rather the focus lies on the fire development in the early stages that are significant for 
assuring the safety of people during evacuation. Because of this the geometry used in this work is 
fairly simple and represents a corridor with cabins on both sides. 
Since it has been shown that the FRP construction can maintain integrity and temperature 
requirements for 60 minutes, given it has sufficient fire insulation (Hertzberg et al., 2009), the 
production of toxins generated from the FRP will not be studied. This will have an effect only in the 
later stages of the fire and therefore does not pose a threat to the people evacuating. The same 
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reasoning applies to a possible collapse of the construction during evacuation, since it is sufficiently 
protected by the thermal insulation and has been shown to maintain its load bearing capacity for 60 
minutes (Hertzberg et al., 2009). 
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2 Methodology 
The approach that was used to compare the risk level 
between the FRP and steel case was based on risk 
assessment which is a part of the risk management process, 
shown in Figure 2.1. The first step in this process is 
establishing the context including goals, strategies and 
different prerequisites for the whole risk management 
process. The second step is the risk assessment, where the 
identification of hazards combined with an estimation of 
probabilities makes up the analysis and hence lays out the 
options for the risk treatment. The risk treatment is the 
process of choosing actions to reduce or remove the risks. 
Risk management is an iterative process which requires 
constant evaluation and monitoring (ISO 31000, 2009).  
In this project the main focus is put on the risk assessment 
part, marked with the red box. Further, in this 
specific case where the aim is to compare the risk 
level of a steel structure and a FRP composite structure, the 
emphasis is put on determining the consequence part of the 
risk. This is explained by the fact that the difference in 
boundary structure materials will influence the fire 
development and have an impact on the time until critical conditions occur. The difference in building 
materials does however not influence the probability of a fire occurring and does not affect the 
evacuation time since the geometry and the furnishing remains unchanged. Therefore there has been 
little or no regard taken to the estimation of probabilities, instead most focus is put on comparing 
consequences of different scenarios. 
To gain understanding about the risks that may be introduced when using FRP on ships a literature 
study was performed. The literature that was read consisted of previous research which addresses 
issues and gives suggestions on possible solutions to certain problem areas towards implementing 
lightweight materials in the maritime sector. The issues are as mentioned before in 1.1, that a 
lightweight construction such as a FRP composite structure is made up of combustible materials and 
soften at lower temperatures than the conventional steel construction. Since this is dealt with by using 
a larger amount of fire insulation, thus leading to higher gas temperatures and quicker fire growths, the 
added insulation could have a negative effect on the risk level in regard to human safety during 
evacuation.  
The risk analysis in general is the way of gaining input for evaluation of risks and identification of the 
most favorable actions or strategies. It should involve a mapping of risk sources, an estimation of their 
consequences and an establishment of the probabilities for these consequences. These combinations of 
probabilities and consequences must be in line with the risk criteria which are stated by the project. 
There should also be an expressed confidence of the stated risk level, which can be done by for 
example uncertainty analysis (ISO 31000, 2009). In this project the risk analysis was based on a 
relative comparison of the different consequences that emerge from having two choices of 
construction – the lightweight construction and the traditional steel construction. Since the 
probabilities of different fire scenarios are not dependent on the construction materials it is, as 
previously mentioned, not interesting to evaluate or weigh in the probabilities in the risk assessment. 
 
Figure 2.1. Simplified version of the risk 
management process. 
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Hence the focus was instead put on comparing the consequences of the scenarios by preforming fire 
dynamics simulator (FDS) simulations and studying the results. This was done by simulating the 
scenarios in two different setups, one representing the use of a FRP composite structure and the other 
representing a steel structure, a more thorough description of the FDS setup is given in chapter 5. The 
geometry that was used represented a corridor with cabins on both sides and was identical in both the 
FRP and steel case but the building materials that made up the structure varied for the floor-, ceiling- 
and outer wall structure. When comparing the two cases the most critical difference that was specified 
in FDS was however the different design fires that were used. Because of the expected effects of the 
added thermal insulation the design fire that was used in the steel case had a slower growth rate 
compared to the fire used in the FRP case. This was done by studying results and drawing conclusions 
from experiments made in previous research, carried out by Back (2012). Conclusions from the 
previous research are presented in 4.2 and the method used to reduce the fire growth rate is described 
further in 5.4. 
The variable that was used to quantify the risk in order to be able to perform for the risk comparison in 
this project was the time until critical conditions for safe evacuation occurs. The criteria for when 
critical conditions occur were from the Swedish building regulations, as stated in BFS 2013:12 
(Boverket, 2013). The reason for using these criteria is that there are no such criteria specified for ship 
construction. In addition the purpose of the criteria is to enable safe evacuation and since they apply 
for analytical design methods used for land based constructions they should be applicable for safe 
evacuation in maritime environments as well. For a view of the mentioned criteria see Table 2.1. 
In order for the evacuation to be considered safe, criterion 1 or 2 and criteria 3-5 must be fulfilled 
(Boverket, 2013).  
Table 2.1. Translated to English from BFS 2013:12 (Boverket, 2013). 
 Level of critical impact in the analysis of  
evacuation safety  
Criterion Level 
1. The smoke layer height above the floor Minimum of 1.6 + (room height (m) x 0.1)  
2. Visibility, 2.0 m above the floor 
 
10.0 m in spaces >100 m
2
 
5.0 m in spaces ≤100 m2 
The criterion can also apply to situations 
where queuing occurs at an early stage, at the 
place where the queue arises. 
3. Thermal radiation / heat dose Maximum of 2.5 kW/m
2
 or a short-lived  
radiation at a maximum of 10 kW/m
2
 
combined with a maximum of 60 kJ/m
2
 in 
addition to the energy from a radiation level 
of 1 kW/m2 
4. Temperature Maximum of 80 ° C 
5. Toxicity, 2.0 m above the floor Carbon monoxide concentration (CO)<2000 
ppm  
Carbon dioxide concentration (CO2) <5%  
Oxygen concentration (O2)>15% 
 
Of the five given criteria the focus was put on the three criteria that apply for smoke layer height, 
visibility and temperature. The radiation criterion would be of interest but since the radiation model in 
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FDS requires a larger amount of simulation time in order to make good predictions this variable is not 
measured. Production of toxic species was also not measured as previously mentioned in 1.4. 
The measurements for visibility and temperatures were made at a height of 2 m above the floor, along 
the centerline of the corridor. The reason for measuring the times until critical conditions in the 
corridor is that it is the only escape route from a cabin. Looking at the critical conditions inside the 
cabins would only be relevant for the case when people are still inside the cabin at the time of critical 
conditions within the cabin, which is highly unlikely. The reason for measuring the temperature at the 
height of 2 m is that this is what is proposed by BIV- the official Swedish chapter of the Society of 
Fire Protection Engineers (2013).  
There were four different scenarios that were part of the risk analysis. The scenarios were as follows: 
1. A FRP composite structure is used and sprinkler activation takes place. 
2. A steel structure is used and sprinkler activation takes place. 
3. A FRP composite structure is used and no sprinkler activation takes place. 
4. A steel structure is used and no sprinkler activation takes place. 
Since FDS cannot account for the effects that the boundaries have on the HRR, the difference in HRR 
between the steel and the FRP case was taken into account by, as previously mentioned choosing a 
lower fire growth rate in the steel case. This method is further described in 5.4. 
The results from the scenario analysis were extracted with FDS2ASCII from temperature and visibility 
slice files in the corridor. The values were time averaged over 10 seconds where the intervals between 
the measured times were 10 seconds and 20 seconds where the intervals between the measured times 
were 50 seconds. The averaging over time was done in order to get smoother lines and make sure no 
extreme values were chosen. The values were extracted from the centerline of the corridor at 2 m 
above the floor. 
The results are shown in two different types of diagrams (see examples of these in Figure 2.2):  
1. With visibility and temperatures 
on the y-axis and the corridor 
length on the x-axis. The 
different curves within each 
diagram, represents a step in 
time. Critical conditions are also 
presented in these diagrams as 
horizontal lines. 
2. With a time on the x-axis and a 
fraction that expresses the 
amount of corridor area where 
critical condition have occurred 
on the y-axis. 
Looking at the type 1 diagrams it is 
possible to see that critical conditions 
have occurred in the center of the 
corridor for different times. For every 
time step, i.e. every curve, it is possible 
Figure 2.2. Examples of result diagrams. 
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to see that a larger part of the corridor is under critical conditions. For the time t+3n there are critical 
conditions over the whole length of the corridor. Consequently, these diagrams shows time until 
critical conditions, without a specification of how big fraction of the corridor that is regarded as 
acceptable regarding occurrence of critical conditions. 
In the type 2 diagram, it is possible to see the variation in time until critical conditions occur in a given 
fraction of the corridor. For an example when the whole corridor is under critical conditions (fraction 
= 1) the difference in time for scenario A and B is ~20 seconds. The red line indicates the threshold 
where an unacceptable fraction of the corridor is exposed to critical conditions. This fraction was 
specified to 0.18, which represents an area that stretches over the nearest adjacent cabin doors. This 
fraction was chosen since it is the point where evacuation becomes unsafe for people in other cabins 
than the fire cabin (in which people are not expected to be present during the fire anyway). For an 
explanation, see Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3. Threshold for acceptable fraction of corridor for occurrences of critical conditions and possible escape 
routes. 
 
The program Smokeview was used for determining the smoke layer height. The soot mass fraction 
was captured and rendered in 2D pictures with a view of the whole corridor at the time when the 
visibility criterion became critical in the 18% fraction. This time was chosen since the purpose was to 
decide which of the parameters that was decisive when determining the time until critical conditions. 
This is because the requirement states that only one of the two criteria must be fulfilled in order to 
maintain safe evacuation conditions. Also pictures from the later stages showing the stabilized smoke 
layer height have been extracted from smokeview. 
In order to evaluate uncertainties, a sensitivity analysis was carried out. The results from these 
simulations were taken from output data from devices and pictures rendered from slice files. 
The first two parts of the sensitivity analysis consisted of simulations that had the purpose of making 
sure an appropriate model was chosen. Firstly two different FDS versions were compared and 
secondly the results from three different grid sizes were analyzed to make sure that the end results 
produced from the simulations would be of good quality. However, the main part of the sensitivity 
analysis focused on the parameter that has a direct effect on the relative difference in time until critical 
conditions for the steel and the FRP case. This parameter is the fire growth rate. Hence, new 
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simulations were performed where the growth rate was varied to see how this influenced the 
investigated variables. 
A parameter that does by an equal amount influence the output in both simulation cases would not be 
of interest, since it does not change the relative difference in risk level in the comparison between the 
steel and the FRP case. For example, if the soot yield of the fuel is increased by the same amount in 
both cases the visibility will decrease by the same relative amount in both simulations. To prove this 
point simulation where the soot yield was increased were included in the sensitivity analysis.  
To summarize the parameters investigated in the sensitivity analysis were: 
- Choice of FDS version. 
- Grid size.  
- Soot yield of the fire. 
- Difference in fire growth rate between the steel and FRP case. 
With the results from the simulations, conclusions were drawn on whether the level of risk for a FRP 
structure is acceptable relative to the steel structure during the early stages of a fire when people are 
expected to be evacuating. 
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3 Theory 
This chapter will provide a technical background for this project. Starting with a background in basic 
fire dynamics and then going through different design method for sprinklered fires. 
3.1 Basic fire dynamics 
The development of an enclosure fire can be described in different ways, Karlsson and Quintiere 
(2000) divide it into the following phases: 
 ignition 
 growth 
 flashover 
 fully developed fire 
 decay 
The ignition, which can be either piloted or spontaneous, is the start of the combustion process and the 
heat production or in plain words the fire. Following the ignition the fire enters the growth phase 
where the heat release rate increases. Several parameters influence how fast the fire grows for example 
the fuel properties, the amount of available oxygen and the surroundings. The next possible phase that 
can be achieved is flashover where the fire swiftly spreads to all combustible materials and the 
compartment is engulfed in flames. This causes an intense rise in the heat release rate and is followed 
by the fully developed fire phase were the peak heat release rate is reached. The fully developed fire 
will continue to burn and the high heat release rate will be maintained until there is an insufficient 
amount of either oxygen or fuel. Once the amount of available oxygen is too low or most of the fuel 
has been consumed the fire will start to decay. During the decay phase the heat release rate gradually 
declines as the oxygen and fuel levels diminish (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). The development of the 
fire is also shown in Figure 3.1, the figure has been slightly altered to illustrate the heat release rate of 
the fire instead of the temperature in the compartment on the vertical axis. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Description of a possible fire development for an enclosure fire.  
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Since flashover is of such a significant event it is also common to simply divide the fire into two 
stages depending on whether or not flashover has occurred. In this way a fire can be described as a 
pre-flashover fire or a post-flashover fire. From a human safety perspective the pre-flashover stage of 
the fire is of most importance since it is during this time that people will be evacuating in the majority 
of cases (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). It is highly unlikely that someone who has not evacuated a 
compartment before flashover will survive and the risk of the fire spreading to neighboring 
compartments will also greatly increase once flashover has occurred. Because of this it is important to 
investigate if a fire can reach the flashover stage but also how long the time until flashover will be 
since this can give a first indication on whether people will have time to evacuate (Drysdale, 2011).  
As earlier mentioned there are different parameters that influence the development of a fire. Some of 
these are tied to the fuel properties, the placement of the fuel and the ignition source while others 
depend on the enclosure properties such as the geometry and the thermal properties of the enclosure 
boundaries (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). It is not difficult to grasp the fact that some types of fuels 
give more intense fires and that the size and position of the fire source will greatly impact the early fire 
growth since these factors affect the fire directly. The enclosure properties should however not be 
overlooked. Even if these parameters may not have the same direct influence on the fire development 
they will most certainly play an important role. For example ceiling height and the insulation 
capabilities of the boundaries determine the level of radiation that is reflected towards the fuel bed and 
thus influences the mass loss rate that is proportional to the heat release rate (Drysdale, 2011). In the 
following chapter the effects of the enclosure boundaries will be more thoroughly described. The 
effects of the geometrical properties will not be specified in this report since it does not relevant for 
this specific case. 
3.1.1 The influence of the enclosure boundaries 
One of the factors that can influence the fire growth and the time to flashover is as mentioned above 
the thermal properties of the boundary materials. More specifically these properties are thermal 
conductivity (k), density (ρ) and specific heat (c) which together form a property called thermal inertia 
(kρc). Insulating materials like mineral wool that are intended to conserve heat or protect the structure 
from high temperatures have a low thermal inertia and will therefore act like an obstacle that limits the 
amount of heat entering the structure. This results in higher gas temperatures within the enclosure 
since more of the energy is retained inside the fire compartment (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). As 
previously mentioned this will cause the heat release rate to increase faster as well because of the 
greater mass loss rate of fuel that arises due to the thermal radiation from the hotter smoke layer and 
boundary surfaces. It is important to realize that it is mainly the innermost layer of the boundaries, 
namely the inner surface material that significantly affects the temperature and heat release rate 
increase. Since it is closest to the fire it will be directly exposed to the heat flux unlike the inner 
materials. In most practical cases insulation material is covered by some kind of surface material for 
example gypsum- or fiber boards which have a higher thermal inertia than the insulation and the 
effects of added insulation on fire growth is therefore limited. Added insulation can however still give 
some effects and tends to contribute to a more severe fire once it is fully developed since the thermal 
conduction through the boundaries is limited and thus the temperature in the compartment will be 
higher (Drysdale, 2011). 
3.2 Sprinklers 
In SOLAS II-2/10.6.1 it is clearly stated that passenger ships that carry more than 36 passengers must 
be protected with an automatic sprinkler system in all spaces, except for those spaces where the fire 
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risk is low or where water may damage more than it helps. The latter is e.g. spaces such as control 
stations with water-sensitive equipment (IMO, 2004). 
To fulfill the SOLAS requirements for sprinkler systems, the guidelines from Resolution A.800(19) 
developed by IMO (1995) must be followed, i.e. the sprinklers should be water mist sprinklers, have 
fast response characteristics and activate at temperatures ranging from 57 to 79°C (IMO, 1995).  
3.2.1 Influence on fire 
Sprinkler activation influences the fire scenario in several ways. Firstly, the heat release rate will be 
reduced by the sprinkler. Secondly, the conditions regarding temperatures, gas flow and toxicity 
within the compartment will change not only because of the change in heat release rate, but also 
because of the turbulence induced by the evaporating water. When the sprinkler activates the fire 
either gets extinguished or becomes controlled by the sprinkler. The amount of toxic gases, heat and 
soot produced depends on the fuel and the heat release rate of the fire, and thereby can be reduced by 
an effective sprinkler. Sprinkler tests have shown that using sprinklers is a way of decreasing the heat 
release rate on the fire before critical conditions for human safety has been reached, with a reliability 
of 90-95 %. However, it does not mean that the fire does not produce a lot of gases even if it is 
controlled by a sprinkler. There is a production of gases ongoing when the sprinkler is active; yet, it 
has been shown that the temperature and toxicity of the gases are so low that they do not pose a threat 
to people in the fire compartment. In smaller compartments, such as cabins, the gases become mixed 
when sprinkler is active, meaning that it is not possible to distinguish a stratified gas layers within the 
enclosure (Nystedt, 2011). 
Depending on whether or not the fire is extinguished or controlled, the heat release rate will be 
influenced in different ways. These different ways can be accounted for when choosing the design fire 
and these design fire methods will be described in the following design methods. What also affects the 
impact the sprinkler has on the fire is how well it hits the flames and how great the fire has become 
before the sprinkler activates (Nystedt, 2011). 
3.2.2 Sprinklered design fire 
To choose a design fire that represents a given fire scenario, the HRR of the unsprinklered design fire 
must first be established. Subsequently, the unsprinklered design fire has to be modified so that it 
represents the sprinklered case of the fire. There are several ways to do this. Some of them are 
described below. 
1. Tests have shown that fires that have a lower HRR than 5 MW when sprinkler activates 
become extinguished (Nystedt, 2011). A 5 MW fire is considered the maximum that can occur 
in smaller enclosures such as offices or apartments. Seeing that sprinklers are highly effective 
in smaller fire enclosures, it is conservative to assume that: 
 The HRR of the sprinklered fire is constant for one minute after sprinkler activates 
 After that the HRR of the fire decreases linearly during one minute to one third of the 
HRR that was reached at the time of activation.  
 Then the HRR remains constant at one third during the remaining course of the fire 
(Nystedt, 2011). See Figure 3.2 for visualization of the method. 
2. The HRR can be assumed to remain at the level where it was when the sprinkler activated 
throughout the duration of the fire. This is a traditional but rather conservative approach since 
it builds on the assumption that the sprinkler can only control the fire and not extinguish it 
(Staffansson, 2010). If the fire is larger and has a HRR ≥ 5 MW when the sprinkler activates, 
Nystedt (2011) proposes the use this approach. See Figure 3.2 for visualization of the method. 
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3. Madrzykowski & Vettori (1992) developed an empirical equation for sprinkler fire 
suppression, which is the next method described. By multiplying the HRR at sprinkler 
activation with a reduction factor,                          it is possible to take into account the 
suppression effect from the sprinkler. The formula for  ̇, heat release rate, would be: 
  ̇               ̇           
                      , and should be calculated for an 
appropriate amount of time steps in order to represent an acceptable HRR curve. This is an 
empirical equation that builds on observations of sprinklered and unsprinklered full scale fire 
tests of unshielded fuels that can be expected to find in an office fire. The algorithm is 
applicable when using sprinklers with a spray density of at least 0.07 mm/s(4.20 mm/min), in 
light hazard occupancies (Madrzykowski & Vettori, 1992). See Figure 3.3 for visualization of 
the method. 
4. The next method was brought forth by Evans (1993) and builds on the previous empirical 
equation. However, the formula has been modified so that it includes the influence that the 
water density has on the fire suppression. The resulting formula is: 
  ̇               ̇           
                      (  ̇ )
     
  , where  ̇  is the water density in 
mm/s. Evans (1993) claims the algorithm to be a conservative estimation of the suppression, 
because it does not take into account the effects the sprinkler has on the convection driven by 
the fire. The data used were mainly from experiments from Madrzykowski & Vettori (1992), 
with sprinkler spray densities higher than 0.07 mm/s, and therefore has the same limitations as 
the previous empirical formula (Evans, 1993). See Figure 3.3 for visualization of the method. 
 
Figure 3.3. Visualization of methods 3 and 4 for choosing of sprinklered design fire. 
Figure 3.2. Visualization of methods 1 and 2 for choosing of sprinklered design fire.  
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4 Previous research 
In this chapter previous research that is relevant to the project is presented and the most important 
content is summarized. The chapter is the result of the literature study that was performed in the early 
stages of the project and much of the information has been gathered from the LASS project. 
4.1 Use of lightweight materials 
The LASS project has as previously mentioned provided important knowledge on how to implement 
the use of lightweight materials on different kinds of ships. Besides the technical and mechanical 
design difficulties that are presented when converting to new construction materials there is also a 
problem with regard to fire safety design. Social and economic factors also play a part in making the 
transition more difficult because of the strong tradition of using steel structures and the higher initial 
building costs that the new materials entail. The LASS project can be seen as a large step in the right 
direction in regard to overcoming these problems. This is achieved by demonstrating that full scale 
structures can work in practice and suggesting possible ways to satisfy the present demand for fire 
safety. LASS also proves that lightweight constructions can be favorable from an economic standpoint 
if the costs for the entire lifecycle of the ship are analyzed (Hertzberg et al., 2009).   
Two separate lightweight materials were used in LASS, aluminum and a FRP composite (consisting of 
a lightweight core made of PVC foam with a FRP laminate on each side). One of the four ships that 
were studied was a 188 m long RoPax vessel where the objective was to replace the existing steel 
superstructure with a FRP composite superstructure. The knowledge and information gained in this 
part of the LASS project will be of great importance when analyzing potential fire safety risks with 
connection to the use of FRP composites (Hertzberg et al., 2009).  
The single largest difficulty with using a FRP composite material is the fact that it is combustible 
whereas the traditional material, steel, is not. Another issue is that the FRP composite can lose its 
structural strength at about 100°C due to the softening of the interface between the core material and 
the laminate. More temperature resistant composites that soften at 150-200°C are available but these 
consist of polymers that are more expensive and core materials that often have mechanical 
disadvantages. The temperatures are in any case low compared to the softening temperature of steel 
which is 400-500°C. These issues can however be solved by using additional thermal insulation in 
order to protect the FRP composite structure from high temperatures (Hertzberg et al., 2009). 
4.2 Effects of increased thermal insulation 
Research conducted by Rodríguez Panagiotopoulos (2014) regarding the use of FRP onboard a large 
passenger ship showed that added thermal insulation used to protect the FRP greatly improves the fire 
safety performance compared to an unprotected FRP structure. However, it also showed an increase in 
gas temperatures due to the added insulation. No consideration was taken to how this difference in 
temperature might affect the heat release rate. 
Other previous research on the effects of increased thermal insulation has been done by Back (2012). 
The study was based on comparisons between large scale experiments, FDS simulations and hand 
calculations. The large scale experiments consisted of wood crib and heptane pool fires within 
containers, with and without thermal insulation on the walls and roof. The insulation that was used 
consisted of 95 mm thick Rockwool sheets. The container used was 5.9x2.35x2.4 m
3
, which is a 
volume representative for a cabin, i.e. around 30 m
3
 and had a door opening.  
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Back (2012) arrived at the conclusions that: 
 Maximum gas temperatures within the insulated enclosure were on average 18% higher in the 
wood crib case and 26 % higher in the heptane fire case compared to the non-insulated cases. 
 Slightly higher heat release rates can be expected in the insulated cases, especially when fuels 
that are sensitive to incident radiation are present. 
 
 The fire growth rate was roughly twice as large in the insulated container compared to the 
non-insulated one when heptane was used as the fuel.  
In the wood crib case the growth rate did not increase significantly but the heat release rate was higher 
during the entire growth phase for the insulated compartment. 
4.3 SOLAS division classes 
In SOLAS II-2/3.2 and SOLAS II-2/3.4 fire resistance classifications for construction materials used 
on ships are defined. These can be divided into three different classes, A-, B- and C-class. The A- and 
B-class constructions can be divided further into different types of divisions depending on how well 
they prevent heat transfer. This property is given as a suffix in the form of a number that specifies the 
time in minutes that the temperature on the backside of the material is within the predefined 
temperature limits (IMO, 2004).  
A-class divisions are typically used in bulkhead and deck constructions. They have to be constructed 
in steel or equivalent materials and must be able to uphold integrity for one hour during a large scale 
standard furnace fire test. Further, non-combustible insulation materials must be used so that 
depending on which suffix the division has the requirements for temperature restrictions are met for 
the specific division. For an A-class construction e.g. A-60
*
 the average temperature on the unexposed 
side must not increase more than 140C and the maximum temperature increase at any point must not 
exceed 180C. In order to obtain the classification bulkheads and decks are tested according to the 
FTP Code (International Code for the Application of Fire Test Procedures) to insure that the 
requirements above are met (IMO, 2004). The test procedure for the testing is specified in IMO 
resolution A.754(18) (IMO, 1993). In addition to these tests the materials must also pass a test in 
accordance with ISO 1182 where a material sample is heated to a temperature of 750
o
C to make sure it 
is non-combustible (Hertzberg et al., 2009). 
B-classifications are used not only for bulkheads and decks but also linings and ceilings. B-class 
materials must be non-combustible and able to maintain integrity for half an hour during a large scale 
standard furnace fire test. The insulation should prevent an average temperature increase of 140C on 
the unexposed side and a maximum increase of 225C at any location during the time given by the 
suffix
†
 (IMO, 2004). 
C-class structures are used in areas where fire risks are low and have no requirements regarding 
integrity or insulation but must be constructed in non-combustible materials (IMO, 2004). 
A summary of the different classes, their requirements and which divisions exists within each class 
can be seen in Table 4.1. 
                                                     
*
 There are four different “A” divisions: A-60, A-30, A-15, A-0 
†
 There are two different “B” divisions: B-15, B-0. 
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Table 4.1. Summary of SOLAS class and division requirements. 
Classification Allowed materials Integrity  
Requirement 
Temperature restriction 
on backside 
Division 
types 
A-class Steel or equivalent 60 min Average: 140°C 
Maximum: 180°C 
A-60, A-30,  
A-15, A-0 
B-class Non-combustible 30 min Average: 140°C 
Maximum: 225°C 
B-15, B-0 
C-class Non-combustible - - - 
 
4.3.1 The LASS approach 
The prescriptive requirements described in the previous chapter are impossible to comply with when 
using a FRP composite structure since the material is not equivalent to steel and will not pass the non-
combustibility test. It is however still possible to build a FRP composite structure in accordance with 
SOLAS II-2/17 (IMO, 2004). By using this option, that enables the use of alternative designs, any 
construction materials can be used as long as they comply with the functional requirements described 
in SOLAS. The approach that was used in LASS to achieve this consisted of showing the 
constructions fulfillment of the functional requirements of the A-, B- and C class divisions for fire 
resistance classification. This was done in a rather straight forward way by testing the constructions 
according to the High-Speed Craft Code (HSC Code) which does not demand the passing of the ISO 
1182 non-combustibility test (Hertzberg et al., 2009). Unlike the conventional fire resistance 
classifications described in SOLAS the HSC Code also enables the use of fire-restrictive materials 
(FRM), rather than strictly non-combustible ones, and constructions that are fire-resistant divisions 
(FRD), see HSC 7.2.1. For a construction material to be classified as fire-restricting  it must, according 
to the FTP code, pass the ISO 9705 full-scale corner fire test with some modifications, see HSC 7.2.2 
& 7.4.1.3 (Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 2000). These involve changes in measurements of heat 
release rate and smoke production (Hertzberg et al., 2009). These modifications are specified in 
resolution MSC.40(64) and further amendments are made in MSC.45(65) as well as in MSC.90(71), 
see HSC 7.2.2 & 7.4.1.3 (Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 2000).  
A construction composed of FRM materials can in the same way as the non-combustible constructions 
be put through the large-scale furnace fire test to obtain a classification. Since the materials used are 
not non-combustible the constructions cannot be classed as A- or B-class but instead FRD 30 or FRD 
60 (Hertzberg et al., 2009). The FRD 30 constructions must according to HSC 7.4.2.2 maintain 
integrity for 30 minutes and the FRD 60 for 60 minutes during the furnace test. According to HSC 
7.2.1.5 The temperature restriction requirements are the same as for the A-class constructions namely 
that the average temperature increase, on the unexposed side, is no more than 140
o
C and the maximum 
temperature increase at any point no more than 180
o
C. This applies to both the FRD 30 and the FRD 
60 class (Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 2000). However since the laminate can start to separate 
from the core at 100°, which causes the FRP composite to lose its strength, this is the critical 
temperature that is used when studying the temperature restriction of the construction (Hertzberg et al., 
2009). 
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For a summary of the different classes and their functional requirements, see Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Summary of HSC code class requirements. 
Classifications Allowed materials Integrity  
Requirement 
Temperature restriction 
on backside 
FRD 60 
 
FRM 60 min Average: 140°C 
Maximum: 180°C 
FRD 30 FRM 30 min Average: 140°C 
Maximum: 180°C 
FRM FRM - - 
 
The HSC code, as the name suggests, only provides prescriptive requirements for high-speed crafts. 
However, since it has been adopted by IMO and is part of SOLAS it must therefore comply with the 
same functional requirements. There are two main criteria that passenger ships have to fulfill in order 
to be defined as high speed crafts. According to HSC 1.3.4.1 the ship must first and foremost be able 
to reach a place of refuge within four hours from the course of its travel when cruising at its 
operational speed. Secondly the ship must be able to travel at a speed that it at least as high as the 
speed calculated with equation given below: 
            [m/s] 
Where   is the volume [m3] of displacement when the hull is submerged up to the design waterline, 
see HSC 1.4.30 (Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 2000).  
To clarify, passenger ships that fulfill the criteria above are thus able to use FRP composite structures 
in compliance with the perspective requirements of the HSC code. Examples of these types of carriers 
are high speed catamaran ferries and carriers used by the coast guards. For other large passenger ships 
that are not classed as high-speed crafts it must be shown that the functional requirements of the 
SOLAS convention can be met if a FRP composite superstructure is to be used. As previously 
mentioned, in LASS this is done by arguing that the functional requirements for the FRD and FRM 
can be seen as equivalent to the A-, B- and C-class constructions. This means that if it can be 
demonstrated that the FRP composite structure complies with the prescriptive requirements of the 
HSC code it will also meet the functional requirements of SOLAS (Hertzberg et al., 2009). For a view 
of the SOLAS and HSC classes that are equivalent regarding functional requirements, see Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. SOLAS – HSC code class equivalency. 
Prescriptive requirement  
(SOLAS convention)  
Functional requirement equivalency  
(HSC code) 
A-class FRD 60 
B-class FRD 30 
C-class FRM 
 
It should be noted that this approach may come across as a solution that automatically enables the use 
of FRP composite structures but that is not the case. The main reason for this is that there is another 
important functional requirement in SOLAS that states that the use of combustible materials shall be 
restricted. This coupled with the strong tradition of using steel constructions that provide a reliable and 
well-tested solution makes it hard to argue that the same level of fire safety will be achieved when 
using a FRP composite structure (Hertzberg et al., 2009). Therefore this approach does not by default 
give authorization to build FRP composite structures without a risk analysis being performed for the 
specific case.   
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5 Simulation setup 
In this chapter, the setup for the FDS simulations will be presented. Input data for all essential options 
will be specified, and those options valued to have a smaller significance will be found in 11Appendix 
A. 
In total 14 different simulations were carried out. Four of them make up the scenario analysis. The rest 
is for sensitivity analysis purposes and their specific deviations from the base scenarios are presented 
in chapter 6.6. 
The geometry that represents the scenarios that was simulated is presented in Figure 5.1. The 
geometry was however scaled down in the FDS simulations in order to save time, this was done by 
removing most of the cabins since they would have no influence on the results, see Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.1. Background to simulation geometry. 
5.1 Computational domain 
In order to decrease the computation time, the computational domain was divided into several smaller 
meshes, so that they could be run with parallel processing using the MPI function in LUNARC. The 
number of meshes chosen per FDS computation was eight because there are eight nodes at disposal 
per node in the LUNARC cluster. The meshes are divided as in Figure 5.2. A detailed description can 
be found in the bullet list below: 
 The orange mesh on the first floor contains the fire room, a piece of the room across the 
corridor and the middle segment of the corridor. Grid size varied between different 
simulations. 
 The marine blue mesh is the main part of the room across the corridor from the fire room. 
Grid size was 0.10 m in all simulations. 
 The yellow meshes are the main parts of the corridor. Grid size varied between different 
simulations. 
 The green meshes are the rooms adjacent to the fire enclosure. Grid size was 0.10 m in all 
simulations. 
 The purple mesh is the room above the fire enclosure. Grid size was 0.10 m in all 
simulations. 
 The small light blue mesh poses as an air cavity in the outer wall of the fire enclosure. This 
mesh has very small cells, in order to capture possible convective gas movement due to 
increased temperature. Grid size was 0.025 m in all simulations 
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First floor only      Second floor  
(purple)  
 The grey meshes are placed in order to achieve numerical stability in the pressure iterations. 
They are open to the atmosphere and contain only air. Grid size was 0.2 m in all simulations. 
Figure 5.2. The multiple meshes of the computational domain. 
5.1.1 Grid size 
The grid size for corridor and fire room meshes was 0.1 m for the simulations in the sensitivity 
analysis. The scenario analysis was simulated with the grid size 0.05 m in these meshes. For more 
information about the choice of grid sizes, see 7.2. 
5.2 Geometry 
How the overall geometry and room placement was chosen has been hinted at in the previous sub 
chapter, where the meshes are described. However, a more thorough description will be presented in 
this sub chapter.  
In order to achieve comparability of results, the choice in building materials and room size have as 
much as FDS permitted reflected a full scale cabin fire experiment that Arvidson, Axelsson & 
Hertzberg (2008) conducted. 
For a view of the full geometry in 3D, and 2D perspective see Figure 5.3 - Figure 5.6 on pages 22-23. 
The geometry consisted in total of a corridor and five cabins of which one was the fire compartment. 
The remaining cabins were specified for the purpose of investigating the heat transport through the 
inner walls. Consequently, devices were placed in order to measure the temperatures in the adjacent 
rooms. These are presented in 5.3. The height of the first floor was 2.7 m. An inner ceiling was added 
at a height of 2.1 m above the floor, between the ceiling and the overhead deck there was consequently 
a 0.6 m air cavity. The corridor measured 1.2 x 21 x 2 m and the rooms measured 4.3 x 3 x 2.1 m. The 
fire room also had an air cavity along the short-side wall (assumed to be an outer wall) which was 0.2 
m wide, and represented with a mesh entirely on its own, see chapter 5.1. All the doors connecting the 
cabins to the corridor are assumed to be shut except for the door of the fire cabin. The door chinks 
were represented with a square element of 0.01 m
2*
. The two ends of the corridor were specified as 
open to the outer meshes, resulting in an indirect opening to the atmosphere. An assumption that 
follows from having the corridor open is that the possibility of any obstructions affecting the smoke 
filling is neglected. Consequently, the FDS simulations are only applicable for open or very long 
corridors, and in an early stage of the fire. 
5.2.1 Building materials 
The building materials of the steel and the FRP case were obviously different. In this sub chapter a 
specification will be presented on which building materials that was used in the walls, decks and 
bulkheads. There will be a lot of materials referred to with the line MATL_ID. Most values for these 
                                                     
*
 This represents a door chink with the width 80 centimeters and the height 1.25 centimeters. 
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are also given a ramp function that makes the value temperature dependent. See Appendix B for these 
material data. All surface lines that will be presented in following sub chapters have a corresponding 
surface line with the command BACKING=’EXPOSED’ added. The placement of the walls where 
backing exposed was added is presented in 0. The command was added for those walls where an 
increase of temperature was expected. 
Inner walls and ceiling 
According to the LASS project B-class divisions are often used in accommodation areas: “B-class 
divisions; typically used in cabins or corridors “- (Hertzberg et al., 2009, p.25). However, what can be 
stated from contents in regulation SOLAS II-2/9.2.2.3 is that the choice of class is more complicated 
than assuming that all inner walls and ceilings shall be B-class divisions. The class choice of a wall, 
bulkhead or deck depends on what type of room is above, below or adjacent to the reference room. 
E.g. if there is an external evacuation route adjacent to a corridor, there should be an A-60 division 
between. However, between a corridor and an accommodation space with increased fire risk, there 
should be a B-15 division (IMO, 2004). 
 
The surface line for the inner walls was is specified in FDS as shown below, where “Firemaster” is the 
insulation material used, material properties can be found in 11Appendix B. 
&SURF ID= 'B-class panel', COLOR='BLUE', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Steel','Firemaster','Steel', THICKNESS=0.0007,0.0486,0.0007/ 
In the large scale cabin test there were PVC surface layering inside the cabin walls (Arvidson et al., 
2008), this was however neglected in the geometry in the FDS simulations. 
Seeing that the surface was color coded with blue, looking at pictures Figure 5.3 -  Figure 5.4, it is 
possible to recognize which walls that were simulated as B-class panels. The ceiling was specified 
with a deeper blue, but it received the same surface as the walls, i.e. B-class panel. However, the 
ceiling in the fire cabin received a yellow color instead. This ceiling was different since it had a 
function that made it collapse after 420 s the FRP construction simulations and 463 s in the steel 
construction simulations. The reason for this is that in the large scale cabin fire tests with FRP walls 
conducted by Arvidson et al. (2008) the roof collapsed after 420 seconds. This happens at a later time 
in the steel case since the fire is less intense due to the slower growth rate of the fire caused by the 
lesser isolative properties of the construction. The method used in order to apply the delayed ceiling 
collapse in the steel cases consisted of making the ceiling collapse at the time where the HRR was 
equal to the HRR at the time of the collapse in the FRP case.    
Decks 
This is where the FRP and steel constructions became actualized. The composition of materials in the 
decks was not symmetrical as it was for the B-class panel. Hence two surface lines were specified in 
each simulation where backing exposed was used. For the FRP and the steel case this was done as 
given below where “Laminate” is the FRP-laminate, “DivinycellH80” is the lightweight core and 
“RockWool” the insulation material. For material properties see 11Appendix B. 
 
&SURF ID= 'FLOOR+CEILING_upwards', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Firemaster','Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate','RockWool','Aluminium', 
THICKNESS=0.1,0.001,0.05,0.001,0.02,0.002/ FRP 
&SURF ID= 'FLOOR+CEILING_downwards', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Aluminium','RockWool','Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate','Firemaster', 
THICKNESS=0.002,0.02,0.001,0.05,0.001,0.1/ FRP 
&SURF ID='FLOOR+CEILING_upwards_steel', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Firemaster','Steel','RockWool','Aluminium', THICKNESS=0.06,0.0045,0.02,0.002/ Steel 
&SURF ID= 'FLOOR+CEILING_downwards_steel', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Aluminium','RockWool','Steel','Firemaster', THICKNESS=0.002,0.02,0.0045,0.06/ Steel 
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The parts of the lines marked in grey were what represented the FRP respectively steel parts of the 
deck constructions. The remaining parts specified the insulation and the floors. Figure 5.3 makes it 
possible to see that the floor and ceiling i.e. the decks are represented by the pink color which signifies 
the construction made up of the materials listed in the surface lines above. 
 
Figure 5.3. Geometry in 3D perspective. 
Bulkheads 
Only one wall was assumed to be of a bulkhead division, and it was the one that makes up the short 
side walls of the cabins. The surface lines (two for each case because of asymmetry in material 
composition) for this wall for the FRP respectively the steel case were specified as follows: 
&SURF ID= 'FRP inside', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Firemaster','Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate',         
THICKNESS=0.1,001,0.05,0.001/ FRP 
&SURF ID= 'FRP outside', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate','Firemaster',       
THICKNESS=0.001,0.05,0.001,0.1/ FRP 
&SURF ID='Steel inside', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, MATL_ID='Firemaster','Steel', 
THICKNESS=0.06,0.0045/ Steel 
&SURF ID='Steel outside', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, MATL_ID='Steel','Firemaster', 
THICKNESS=0.0045,0.06/ Steel 
 
A view of the placement of this bulkhead is shown in Figure 5.4. The bulkhead was colored red, and in 
front of it was a blue colored wall, which as described previously represents the B-class panel. The 
space between the bulkhead and the B-class division, i.e. the air cavity, is 0.2 m. 
 
 Figure 5.4. Geometry in 3D perspective, with clipped of roof, floor and corridor. 
B-class division in blue 
FRP wall in red 
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Figure 5.5. Geometry in 2D perspective from above. 
Figure 5.6. Geometry in 2d perspective from side. 
 
5.3 Measurements 
The measurements in the FDS simulations were done with slice files and devices for different types of 
quantities. Placements and other properties of these are presented in this sub chapter. 
5.3.1 Devices 
The devices that were used were specified to output data for temperatures and velocities. The devices 
consisted of thermocouples and vector velocity probes with the default properties of FDS. Hence the 
thermocouples had the specific heat and density of nickel, a bead diameter of 0.001
*
 m and an 
emissivity of 0.85. They were placed in trees with heights similar to how they were placed in the 
experiments by Arvidson et al. (2008), see Figure 5.7. But a couple extra devices were added to the 
tree on the second floor, see Figure 5.8.  
                                                     
*
 The thermocouples in the tests by Arvidson et al. (2008) had the diameter 0.0005 m and was of type K. 
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The placements of device trees can be seen in Figure 5.9. The X and Y coordinates of the trees can be 
seen in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Coordinates for device trees. For visualization see Figure 5.9. 
  Device tree name 
  A B C± D E F G H* I J K L 
C
o
o
rd
in
at
es
 
[m
] 
X 4.9 9.9 19.9 9.9 7.5 8.9 10.5 10.5 12.1 13.5 10.5 11.1 
Y 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.3 5.5 
* Tree was placed on the second floor, and was a type B tree. 
± Device at height z=2.0 was mistakenly placed on x=18 instead. 
Figure 5.7. Type A 
device tree, can be 
found on first floor. 
Figure 5.8. Type B device 
tree, can be found on 
second floor. 
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5.3.2 Slice files 
In order to measure outputs for visibility, temperatures and velocities in different planes, a number of 
slice files were placed.  
 Velocity slice files were placed in planes X=10.5, Yi=-0.1,1.3,4.9. 
 Temperature slice files were placed in planes X=10.5, Yi=-0.1,1.3,4.9, Z=1.81 
 Visibility slice file were placed in plane Y=4.9. 
The reason for using the temperature slice in Z=1.81 was to make it possible to investigate the 
temperatures that occur in the critical smoke layer height (1.81 m) which is calculated according to 
Boverket – the Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (2013). The temperature 
slice in y=4.9 was placed for investigation of the critical temperature in the corridor which is 80°C 
(Boverket, 2013). These values are extracted along the center of the corridor at the height 2 m above 
floor level which is the height recommended by BIV (2013). The visibility slice in Y=4.9 was placed 
in order to investigate the critical visibility in the corridor. This visibility should be at least 5 m at the 
height of 2 m if the floor area is less than 100 m
2
. Even though these critical conditions are associated 
with ordinary buildings they are still interesting to investigate since they have an importance for 
human safety during evacuation, and should thereby also be applicable in evacuation situations on 
ships. 
Figure 5.9. Placement of devices. Green is thermocouple, light blue with green is combined thermocouple and velocity 
probe. The black lines on devices are directions for the vector in which the velocity probes measure flow. For 
coordinates see Table 5.1. 
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5.4 Design fire 
The HRR of the FRP case design fire that was used in FDS was based on the HRR that was obtained 
in the full scale experiment performed by SP (Arvidson et al., 2008). The curve was however slightly 
modified and fitted to follow an αt2-curve while still reaching the same peak HRR of 1700 kW, as in 
the full scale experiment. In order to achieve a more representative fire growth phase the maximum 
HRR was reached faster in the modified HRR curve compared to the one acquired in the experiment 
(maximum is reached after 10 min instead of approximately 12 min). This difference does make the 
scenario more severe but still represents a realistic case and is therefore acceptable since the results 
will be more conservative. 
The experiments that were carried out by Back (2012), see 4.2, were used to estimate the HRR that 
was used for the steel case design fire. This was done by decreasing the growth rate of the fire used in 
the FRP case by 17.6% but keeping the same maximum HRR. The reasons for not changing the 
maximum HRR was that the experiments did not show any great increase of this variable also since 
the design fire represents a flashover scenario all the fuel will be burning in both cases which will 
result in similar maximum HRR. The growth rate was however reduced because of the fact that that 
the HRR was higher throughout the entire growth phase of the wood crib fire, which is the case that 
best resembles the fire in the passenger cabin because of the fuel type.  
When the crib fire in the insulated compartment had reached the maximum HRR of around 800kW the 
corresponding fire in the non-insulated compartment had only reached a HRR of approximately 650 
kW which means that the HRR was almost 20% (18.75%) lower at this time. Therefore the growth 
rate for the steel case was set so that the HRR of the steel case was 18.75% lower at the time when the 
maximum HRR was reached in the FRP case. This resulted in the 17,6% lower growth rate when fitted 
to an αt2-curve. Like mentioned earlier the steel case design fire still reaches the maximum HRR of 
1700kW but at a later time because of the lesser growth rate see Figure 5.11. 
The sprinklered design fires were acquired using method number 2 from 3.2.2 and the activation time 
was calculated using a web implementation of DetactT2 by Molinelli (2012). View of input and output 
for the FRP and the steel case can be seen in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10. Print of input and output of web implementation of DetactT2. 
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Figure 5.11 HRR for the different sprinklered and unsprinklered scenarios. 
The fire in the sprinklered and unsprinklered cases had square areas of 0.64 m
2 
respectively 0.09 m
2
. 
The fuel properties were composed of the weighted average of all materials that were assumed to be 
involved in the fire within the cabin. Consequently, the soot yield was 0.067, the CO-yield was 0.045, 
the heat of combustion was 26376 kJ/kg and the number of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen atoms in the 
fuel was 1, 1.6 and 0.2 respectively. These calculations are presented in 0. The HRR of the different 
cases received different ramps, as seen in Figure 5.11. For an example of an input line, see the FDS 
lines below.  
&OBST XB= 10.1,10.9,0.9,1.7, 0.0, 0.0, SURF_IDS='BURNER','INERT','INERT' / Unsprinklered 
&REAC  FUEL='MYFUEL' 
 SOOT_YIELD=0.067 
 CO_YIELD=0.045 
 IDEAL=.TRUE. 
 C=1 
 H=1.6 
 O=0.2 
 HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=26376/  
&SURF ID='BURNER', 
      COLOR='RED' 
      HRRPUA=2656.25, 
      RAMP_Q='RAMP_HRR'/   
&RAMP… 
5.5 Miscellaneous settings 
 The simulation time was set to 900 seconds.  
 The ambient temperature was set to 20 C. 
 The radiative fraction was set to 0.262 (based on the materials in the cabin, see 0). 
 The exterior boundaries of the computational domain were open. 
0
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 The visibility factor used was the default value of 3, which represents visibility towards light-
reflecting signs
*
 (McGrattan et al., 2013).  
 
 
  
                                                     
*
 According to SOLAS 13/3.2.5.1 those types of signs are allowed (IMO, 2004). 
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6 Results 
This chapter presents output data according to what is described in chapter 2. First, results are 
presented for each scenario separately and then a comparison is made between the results of the two 
sprinklered scenarios and the two unsprinklered scenarios. 
The measure points in adjacent rooms (points E, F, I, J and L) reached at the most a temperature 
increase of 1 C. Because of this, risks in other spaces than the corridor have been neglected, hence the 
output data has not been investigated further. 
6.1 Scenario 1 – Sprinklered FRP 
Looking at Figure 6.1 it is possible to see that for this scenario the temperatures increase in the 
beginning and then, because of sprinkler activation, decrease until they stabilize so that critical 
temperatures can be found only in the middle of the corridor (over a length of 2 meters). Critical 
temperatures start occurring after 130 seconds and the stabilization of the temperatures occurs after 
350-400 seconds. 
 
The visibility (see Figure 6.2) becomes critical after 50 seconds according to the 10 m criterion. After 
90 seconds the whole corridor has a visibility below the critical condition for this criterion. Although 
for the 5 m criterion, the visibility starts becoming critical at 60 seconds and the whole corridor has 
critical visibility after 100 seconds. 
Figure 6.1. Temperature along centerline of the corridor, at the height two meters for 10 seconds intervals. The data is 
time averaged over 10 seconds. 
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Figure 6.2. Visibility along centerline of the corridor, at the height two meters for 10 seconds intervals. The data is 
time averaged over 10 seconds. 
6.2 Scenario 2 – Sprinklered steel 
The same trend as in Scenario 1 – Sprinklered FRP can be seen for the temperatures in the corridor, 
see Figure 6.3. However for this scenario, the time of the first occurrence of critical temperatures is 
150 seconds, which is 20 seconds later than in the other scenario. Also, the temperatures are generally 
slightly lower at the same time intervals in this scenario. The times at which temperatures increase and 
decrease is similar. 
 
The decrease in visibility is generally slower than in Scenario 1 – Sprinklered FRP. The time at which 
the visibility in the whole corridor is below both the 10 m and the 5 m visibility criteria is 100 
Figure 6.3. Temperature along centerline of the corridor, at the height two meters for 10 seconds intervals. The data 
is time averaged over 10 seconds. 
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respectively 110 seconds, which is 10 seconds later than in the other scenario. However the visibility 
starts going below the 10 m criterion at 50 seconds and the 5 m criterion at 70 seconds. 
 
Figure 6.4. Visibility along centerline of the corridor, at the height two meters for 10 seconds intervals. The data is 
time averaged over 10 seconds. 
6.3 Scenario 3 – Unsprinklered FRP 
Looking at Figure 6.5 one can see that the temperature starts going above 80 C in the middle of the 
corridor after 150 seconds and that the whole corridor has temperatures ranging from 80 to 150 C 
after 220 seconds. 
Figure 6.5. Temperature along centerline of the corridor, at the height two meters for 10 seconds intervals. The data is 
time averaged over 10 seconds. 
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 Investigation of visibility showed occurrence of critical conditions in the middle of the corridor after 
50 seconds according to the 10 m criterion for larger spaces. According to the 5 m criterion for smaller 
spaces, critical conditions occur 10 seconds later.  Critical conditions were reached in the whole 
corridor after 90 respectively 110 seconds for the 10 m respectively 5 m criteria, see Figure 6.6. 
 
6.4 Scenario 4 – Unsprinklered steel 
For this scenario the critical conditions in the middle of the corridor are reached after 160 seconds, 10 
seconds later than in Scenario 3 – Unsprinklered FRP. Critical conditions were reached in the whole 
corridor after 240 seconds, which is 20 seconds later than Scenario 3 – Unsprinklered FRP. See Figure 
6.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Visibility along centerline of the corridor, at the height two meters for 10 seconds intervals. The data is 
time averaged over 10 seconds. 
Figure 6.7. Temperature along centerline of the corridor, at the height two meters for 10 seconds 
intervals. The data is time averaged over 10 seconds. 
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The visibility starts becoming critical after 60 seconds, according to the 10 m criterion, and after 70 
seconds according to the 5 m criterion. After 100 seconds the whole corridor has visibility below 
critical according to the 10 m criterion and after 110 seconds according to the 5 m criterion. This is 10 
seconds later than for Scenario 3 – Unsprinklered FRP. See Figure 6.8. 
 
  
Figure 6.8. Visibility along centerline of the corridor, at the height two meters for 10 seconds intervals. The data is 
time averaged over 10 seconds. 
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6.5 Comparison of scenarios 
Before reading this chapter, notice that the graphs show interpolations between different data points. 
6.5.1 Scenario 1 and 2 – sprinklered. 
Time until critical temperatures occur within an unacceptable fraction of the corridor is 164 seconds 
for the steel scenario and 156 seconds for the FRP scenario. The whole corridor holds critical 
temperatures twice as long in the FRP case, which is about 100 seconds, whereas it is only about 50 
seconds in the steel case. However, after sprinkler activation the FRP scenario decreases more rapidly 
and arrives at critical temperatures in an acceptable fraction of the corridor 40 seconds earlier than the 
steel scenario. See Figure 6.9. 
 
Figure 6.9. Fractions of corridor with critical temperature conditions dependent on time for scenario 1 and 2.  
For the 10 m visibility criterion the steel scenario reaches the critical condition within an unacceptable 
fraction of the corridor at 64 seconds. For the FRP scenario this time is 61 seconds. For the 5 m 
criteria, the steel scenario reaches this fraction at 79 seconds, which is 5 seconds later than the FRP 
scenario. See Figure 6.10. 
 
Figure 6.10. Fractions of corridor with critical visibility conditions dependent on time for scenario 1 and 2. 
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Contrary to the temperature the visibility does not stabilize at an acceptable level after sprinkler 
activation. This can be seen in Figure 6.11 where it can be observed that the visibility after 400 
seconds stabilizes at less than 2 m. The differences between scenario 1 and 2 become smaller as time 
goes on. 
 
Figure 6.11. Visibility comparison scenario 1 and 2. Values for 10 minutes. 
6.5.2 Scenario 3 and 4 – unsprinklered. 
As stated previously the threshold where an unacceptable part of the corridor contains critical 
conditions is 18%. The time until the different cases reach this fraction varies. For scenario 1 and 2 
this time can be read from Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13. For the temperature criteria the time varies so 
that the steel scenario fills this fraction with critical temperatures at 185 seconds, which is 12 seconds 
after the FRP scenario. For the 10 m respectively 5 m visibility criteria, the steel scenario has critical 
visibility within this fraction at 2 respectively 7 seconds after the FRP scenario. It seems the time 
differences increase with time for the temperature criteria. In the beginning the differences for this 
criteria is around 10 seconds. When more than 50 percent of the corridor has critical conditions, the 
time differences are around 20 seconds.  
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Figure 6.12. Fractions of corridor with critical temperature conditions dependent on time for scenario 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 6.13. Fractions of corridor with critical visibility conditions dependent on time for scenario 3 and 4. 
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Figure 6.14 below gives a better overview and comparison of the temperature results the unsprinklered 
scenarios. The intervals are 100 seconds but show the temperatures over a larger time than the 
previous temperature charts. In the later stages the gas temperatures have values of several hundred 
degress. The maximum for the FRP case is around 760C whereas the maximum for the steel case is 
around 660C. 
 
Figure 6.14. Temperature comparison scenario 3 and 4. Values for 10 minutes. 
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6.6 Smoke layer height 
This part of the chapter presents the smoke layer heights for the early and later stages of the fire. 
6.6.1 Early stages 
Pictures that show output for the soot mass fraction in the corridor are presented. The times at which 
critical visibility conditions occur in an unacceptable fraction of the corridor have been extracted from 
Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.13. The times are the following for each scenario; 
Scenario 1  - 61 s 
Scenario 2  - 64 s 
Scenario 3  - 63 s 
Scenario 4  - 66 s 
The pictures are extracted for these times, for each scenario respectively, and the critical smoke layer 
height is marked with a red line. The mentioned corridor fraction is marked with a transparent red box. 
For all scenarios the actual smoke layer height inside the corridor fraction has descended below the 
critical smoke layer height, see Figure 6.15 - Figure 6.18. This means that the time until critical 
conditions is judged by the visibility criterion since only one of the two criteria has to be fulfilled 
according to BFS 2013:12 (Boverket, 2013). 
 
Figure 6.15. Soot mass fraction for scenario 1. Time of frame is 61 s. 
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 Figure 6.16. Soot mass fraction for scenario 2. Time of frame is 64 s. 
 
Figure 6.17. Soot mass fraction for scenario 3. Time of frame is 63 s 
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Figure 6.18. Soot mass fraction for scenario 4. Time of frame is 66 s 
 
6.6.2 Later stages 
The smoke layer stabilizes after approximately 500 seconds in scenario 1 and 2 at heights of 1.4 m 
above floor level. For scenario 3 and 4 the stabilization occurs after 450 seconds at heights around 1.2 
m above floor level. Looking at Figure 6.19 and Figure 6.20 it is possible to distinguish a little denser 
smoke in scenario 1 than in scenario 2.  
 
Figure 6.19. Stabilized smoke layer height for scenario 1. Time frame is 500 seconds. 
 
Figure 6.20. Stabilized smoke layer height for scenario 2. Time frame is 500 seconds. 
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Figure 6.21. Stabilized smoke layer height for scenario 3. Time frame is 450 seconds.  
 
Figure 6.22. Stabilized smoke layer height for scenario 4. Time frame is 450 seconds.  
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7 Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis is divided into three separate chapters, the first one concerns the choice of 
FDS version, the second chapter is a summary of the grid independence analysis and the third and 
final chapter describes the sensitivity analysis of some input parameters. 
7.1 Model independence analysis 
The foundations of this model independence analysis can be seen in Appendix E where five different 
curve charts are presented. The simulations used for the analysis were: 
 Scenario 3 - unsprinklered FRP case simulated with FDS 5 (version 5.3.3). 
 Scenario 3 - unsprinklered FRP case simulated with FDS 6 (version 6.1.1). 
The output data that was studied was taken from thermocouple and velocity probe device trees in point 
D and A, and thermocouple tree in point K. The simulation that was run in version 5.3.3 crashed after 
approximately 700 s due to numerical instability. 
7.1.1  Observations from output 
The velocities in measure points for D and A are more fluctuating for FDS 5 than FDS 6. The 
temperatures are generally higher for FDS 6. Regarding the time after the ceiling collapses (420 s) the 
velocities fluctuates much more in FDS 5 than in FDS 6. 
The lowest placed device in point D has different directions of the flow in the different cases. The 
FDS 5 case has a negative velocity, whilst it is positive in FDS 6. This indicates that the neutral plane 
is located higher up in the FDS 5 case than in the FDS 6 case. 
7.1.2 Conclusion 
Since FDS 6 was more stable when calculating velocities it is wise from a time-based project 
perspective to use FDS 6 when simulating all other cases. Since FDS 6 generally had higher 
temperatures and lower neutral plane a use of FDS 6 would also be a more conservative approach. 
Consequently, FDS 6 was used for all other simulations. 
7.2 Grid independence analysis 
The foundations of this grid independence analysis can be seen in Appendix F where several graphs 
and pictures are presented. The simulations that were performed and used in the analysis were: 
 Scenario 3 - unsprinklered FRP case with the medium grid size of 0.10 m. 
 Scenario 3 - unsprinklered FRP case with the coarser grid size of 0.20 m. 
 Scenario 3 - unsprinklered FRP case with the finer grid size of 0.05 m. 
The studied output data came from the thermocouple and velocity probe device trees located in point 
D and A. The fine case had a computational time that extended outside the LUNARC maximum of 
168 hours. Consequently, it ended after 623 s. The medium case had a computational time less than 72 
hours and the coarse case had a computational time less than 10 hours. Both of the latter ones were 
simulated until finish (900 s). 
In the FDS manual by McGrattan et al. (2013) it is proposed that the ratio between the characteristic 
diameter of the fire (D*) and the nominal grid size (δx) should have a value between 4 and 16 since 
these values have shown to give good results. An earlier published source, McGrattan (2007), states 
however that “Past experience has shown that a ratio of 5 to 10 usually produces favorable results at a 
moderate computational cost”. 
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The calculation of D*/δx was made in accordance with the method presented in equation below. It was 
however calculated for every second resulting in a transient presentation of the values, see Figure 7.1. 
The medium case reached the lowest value proposed by McGrattan et al. (2013) after approximately 
200 s, whereas the coarse case did not until about 400 s. The fine case reached the proposed value after 
a little under 100 s. The medium case had, in the later stages of the fire, values that correspond well 
with what has been stated above regarding acceptable results at an acceptable computational cost. The 
coarse case never passed the value 6 and the fine case was in the later stages very high regarding 
computational cost. 
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 ̇ – fire heat release rate,    - density of ambient air,    - specific heat capacity of ambient air,    - 
temperature of ambient air,   – gravitational acceleration (McGrattan et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 7.1. Transient representation of the calculated D*/δx for Medium, Coarse and Fine grid for the unsprinklered 
FRP scenario. 
Since the simulations are used for evaluating the conditions during evacuation from a human safety 
perspective it is important that the grid size is fine enough in the early stages of the fire in order to 
give accurate predictions of the conditions. This is important for both gas spread and temperatures to 
be correctly calculated during the first minutes. A D*/δx that follows the fine time dependency is 
therefore preferable in the early stages of the fire. As can be seen in Figure 7.1, the medium and coarse 
simulations do not reach a sufficient value for D*/ δx until a later stage. In a reasonable results contra 
reasonable computational costs point of view, the D*/δx for the medium case is decent even though it 
is below 4 during the first two minutes. 
7.2.1 Observations from output 
The overall difference between the coarse case and the other cases is large, especially in the doorway. 
Temperatures are lower and the velocity profile has a different shape in the doorway. The resulting 
neutral plane is placed much higher up in the coarse case, resulting in flows in the opposite direction 
for several velocity probe heights. 
Most large deviations between the different cases occur around the lowest device measure point (0.7 m 
above floor) in the doorway. Here, even the differences between the medium and fine cases are large. 
The fine case has temperatures that are several hundred degrees higher. This is because the smoke 
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layer height is lower in the fine case than in the other simulations, which is due to the larger amount of 
air entrainment into the fire plume. The reason for this is that the finer grid is able to capture the 
smaller turbulent eddies, which allows for more entrainment to occur. 
The visual difference from the slice file inside the fire room is big. In the fine simulation the 
turbulence is much better represented in all stages of the fire. 
7.2.2 Conclusion 
For the scenario analysis where it is necessary to correctly investigate the critical conditions during the 
time for evacuation, a fine grid was used for the fire room and the corridor. 
For the sensitivity analysis, the medium grid in the fire room and the corridor was used. This is 
because of two reasons: 
1. Exact results showing time to critical conditions are not of as great importance as gaining 
knowledge on how the conditions deviate given different inputs. 
2. The computational cost is much lesser and consequently gives the opportunity to make 
sensitivity analyses on several parameters.  
7.3 Input parameters analysis 
The input parameters investigated in the sensitivity analysis were the soot yield and fire growth rate. 
The corresponding outputs that were analysed were the temperature and visibility for each one of the 
parameters. The scenarios used for the input parameters analysis was scenario 3 and 4 in order to gain 
an understanding on the parameters significance for the results in the scenario analysis. 
The temperatures values were extracted from the devices and presented in both transient graphs for 
each device as well as time averaged
*
 temperature-height profiles for every 100 s.  These devices were 
placed in measure points A, B and C. 
The visibility was extracted from the slice file at y=4.9 m(in the corridor) with FDS2ASCII. The 
extracted values were averaged over 20 seconds for every hundred second. They were also averaged 
over the lengths of the A and C parts of the corridor, at a height of 2 m above the floor. See A and C 
part of the corridor in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2. Geometry for sensitivity analysis 
                                                     
*
 The time average was made over 20s. For example at 100s, the time average is made for values between 90s 
and 110s. 
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7.3.1 Soot yield 
The soot yield was increased by approximately 50%, from the original value 0.067 to 0.1. 
Temperatures 
As expected the temperatures were the same in all measure points regardless of the change in soot 
yield therefore these results are not presented. 
Visibility 
The change in soot yield had a large impact on the visibility. The visibility at 2 m was 30-41% lower 
for the simulation with a higher soot production. There was however no significant difference between 
the impact on the visibility in the FRP and steel case. 
Table 7.1. Corridor part A visibility with different soot yield inputs, 20s time average, value averaged over centreline 
of corridor, height H=2.0. Extracted from FDS2ASCII. 
 Corridor part A 
Time
[s] 
FRP case 
 
 
Visibility [m] 
Higher soot 
yield 
 
Visibility [m] 
Steel case 
 
 
Visibility [m] 
Higher soot 
yield 
 
Visibility [m] 
Difference 
FRP case 
 
Visibility 
change[%] 
Difference 
steel case 
 
Visibility 
change[%] 
100 4.03 2.55 4.80 3.14 -37 -35 
200 0.92 0.58 1.04 0.67 -38 -36 
300 0.53 0.33 0.60 0.38 -37 -36 
400 0.37 0.23 0.42 0.27 -37 -37 
500 0.27 0.17 0.32 0.20 -37 -37 
600 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.16 -35 -37 
700 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.15 -34 -36 
800 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.16 -36 -36 
900 0.25 0.16 0.27 0.17 -36 -38 
MIN DEV -34 -35 
MAX DEV -38 -38 
AVERAGE DEV -36 -36 
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Table 7.2. Corridor part C visibility with different soot yield inputs, 20s time average, value averaged over centreline 
of corridor, height H=2.0. Extracted from FDS2ASCII. 
 Corridor part C 
 
Time 
[s] 
FRP case 
 
 
Visibility [m] 
Higher soot 
yield 
 
Visibility [m] 
Steel case 
 
 
Visibility [m] 
Higher soot 
yield 
 
Visibility [m] 
Difference 
FRP case 
 
Visibility 
change[%] 
Difference 
Steel case 
 
Visibility 
change[%] 
100 3.72 2.39 4.62 2.91 -36 -37 
200 0.97 0.61 1.09 0.70 -37 -36 
300 0.55 0.35 0.61 0.39 -37 -36 
400 0.38 0.25 0.44 0.27 -36 -38 
500 0.28 0.18 0.32 0.20 -36 -35 
600 0.24 0.16 0.26 0.17 -34 -36 
700 0.26 0.17 0.25 0.16 -36 -36 
800 0.26 0.18 0.28 0.18 -30 -37 
900 0.31 0.19 0.28 0.19 -41 -33 
MIN DEV -30 -33 
MAX DEV -41 -38 
AVERAGE DEV -36 -36 
 
7.3.2 Growth rate 
The growth rate was varied compared to the original steel case by decreasing the value in one 
simulation and increasing it in two others. The changes in terms of percentages were -7.1% (alfa 1), 
+7.1% (alfa 2), and +14.3% (alfa 3). Table 7.3 below show how the different growth rates relate to the 
steel case as well as to the FRP case.  
Table 7.3. Input deviations for growth rate sensitivity analysis. 
 alfa 1 alfa steel alfa 2 alfa 3 alfa FRP 
Growth rate [kW/s
2
] 0.00361 0.00389 0.00417 0.00444 0.00472 
Change compared to steel -7.1% - +7.1% +14.3% +21.4% 
Change compared to FRP -23.5% -17.6% -11.8% -5.9% - 
HRR at 600 s [kW] 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 
Temperatures 
The largest differences in shape for the temperature profiles could be observed in the early stages 
where the profile for the lowered growth rate had a larger impact on the temperatures than the other 
cases. The profiles for the later stages were more similar, but the values show that the differences in 
temperatures are larger. Profiles can be seen in Figure 7.3, Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5.  
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Figure 7.3. Temperature measurement in point A. Profiles are averaged over 20s at 100s. 
 
Figure 7.4. Temperature measurement in point B. Profiles are averaged over 20s at 100s. 
 
Figure 7.5. Temperature measurement in point C. Profiles are averaged over 20s at 100s. 
The temperature profiles obtained in the different simulations were very similar for all other measure 
points and time intervals. Because of this, only an example on how the temperatures varied in the later 
stages is presented, see Figure 7.6, Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8.  
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Figure 7.6. Temperature measurement in point A. Profiles are averaged over 20s at 400s. 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Temperature measurement in point B. Profiles are averaged over 20s at 400s. 
 
Figure 7.8. Temperature measurement in point C. Profiles are averaged over 20s at 400s. 
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The absolute deviations in temperatures were around 1-60C, and in percent 0-15% from the steel 
case. The temperature differences are at their maximum in the later stages, at 600 seconds. For a 
quantification of how much temperatures varied compared to the steel case for the different times and 
measure points, see Table 7.4.  
Table 7.4. Corridor temperatures compared to steel case for changes in growth rates (alfa 1, alfa 2 and alfa 3), 20s 
time average, value extracted from devices in measure points A, B and C. 
Time [s] TEMPERATURE CHANGES COMPARED TO STEEL CASE [C] 
Height 2.0, POINT A Height 2.0, POINT B Height 2.0, POINT C 
-7.1% +7.1% +14.3% -7.10% +7.1% +14.3% -7.10% +7.1% +14.3% 
100 s -3 +1 +1 -7 +1 +1 -4 0 +2 
200 s -3 +2 +7 -4 +4 +10 -2 +3 +6 
300 s  -7 +5 +10 -13 +8 +18 -1 +6 +11 
400 s -6 +6 +10 -14 +15 +21 -8 +5 +9 
500 s -7 +9 +19 -19 +19 +36 -7 +6 +11 
600 s -19 +19 +46 -34 +32 +58 -6 +12 +29 
700 s -6 +17 +19 -19 +14 +28 -5 +3 +11 
800 s -15 +11 +6 -20 +5 +13 +5 +8 +15 
900 s +5 +17 +20 -1 +12 +7 -4 +3 +5 
MIN DEV [C] -3 +1 +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 +0 +2 
[%] -4 +3 +3 ~0 +1 +2 ~0 +2 +6 
MAX DEV  [C] -19 +9 +46 -34 +32 +58 -8 +12 +29 
[%] -6 +6 +15 -6 +6 +10 -5 +5 +12 
AVERAGE 
DEV 
 [C] -8 +10 +15 -15 +12 +21 -5 +5 +11 
[%] -3 +4 +6 -3 +3 +5 -2 +3 +5 
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Visibility 
Looking at Table 7.5 it is possible to see that the maximum deviations between the simulations occur 
in the early stages of the fire. The maximum values vary in absolute numbers between 0.24 and 0.65 
m. The smallest deviations are 0 and after 200 seconds the differences between the different 
simulations are only minor, with absolute values around 0.02-0.1 m. In percentages the maximum 
deviation is for alfa 3, which is 14% and the average values lies around 3-5% for alfa 1 and alfa 2 and 
7% for alfa 3. 
Table 7.5. Corridor visibility compared to steel case for changes in growth rates (alfa 1, alfa 2 and alfa 3), 20s time 
average and averaged over corridor part length. Values extracted from slice file in corridor part A and C. 
Time [s] VISIBILITY CHANGES COMPARED TO STEEL CASE [m] 
Corridor Part A Corridor Part C 
-7.1% +7.1% +14.3% -7.10% +7.1% +14.3% 
100 s +0.35 -0.39 -0.50 +0.24 -0.30 -0.65 
200 s +0.04 -0.04 -0.09 +0.05 -0.03 -0.10 
300 s  +0.02 -0.03 -0.06 +0.04 -0.02 -0.04 
400 s +0.02 -0.03 -0.03 +0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
500 s +0.02 -0.01 -0.02 +0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
600 s +0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
700 s -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 +0.01 0.01 
800 s 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 
900 s -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
MIN DEV [m] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[%] 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MAX DEV  [m] +0.35 -0.39 -0.50 +0.24 -0.30 -0.65 
[%] +7.21 -8.06 -10.40 +6.40 -6.49 -14.12 
AVERAGE 
DEV 
 [m] +0.05 -0.06 -0.08 +0.05 -0.05 -0.10 
[%] +4.43 -4.61 -6.83 +4.88 -3.40 -7.07 
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8 Discussion 
The discussion is divided into several parts in order to give a better overview and make it easier to 
follow. The choice of method as well as the results are discussed and analyzed in order to identify 
potential weaknesses as well as to enable the drawing of valid conclusions. 
8.1 Choice of scenarios 
Both the FRP and the steel case were simulated for a sprinklered and an unsprinklered scenario. The 
sprinklered scenario represents the most probable case because of the requirement that demands the 
use of sprinklers onboard large passenger ships. The unsprinklered scenario represents a probable 
worst case event and therefore it will result in more severe consequences. This scenario was chosen in 
order to evaluate the constructions based on events that are somewhat out of the ordinary. The 
probability of sprinkler failure is however relatively low (5-10%). This means that the resulting risk is 
lower than it would be if the probability would have been the same as in the sprinklered scenario.  
8.2 Analysis of results 
To enable a good comparison between the FRP and steel cases the time until critical conditions was 
not just determined for a single location. Instead the differences were, as previously explained, 
measured by calculating the amount of corridor length where critical conditions have occurred at 
different times. This was presented as the fraction of the corridor area where critical conditions were 
present at the given time. This approach had another benefit (besides the additional information gained 
from looking at several locations and times) in that the fraction could be used to define a state were 
critical conditions are not considered to be acceptable. If critical conditions occur in a single point, for 
example directly outside the doorway of the fire compartment, it does not necessarily mean that 
human safety is compromised. In this scenario the assumption is that any person inside the fire cabin 
will either evacuated on time or be beyond saving at the time when critical conditions occur in the 
corridor. Because of this the time to critical conditions directly outside the fire cabin is not deemed to 
be of interest but rather the time where people in the adjacent cabins could be affected by critical 
conditions. This led to the formulation of the criterion that critical conditions should be reached in less 
than 18% of the corridor in order for safe evacuation to be possible.  
The results from the FDS simulations showed some differences in the time until critical conditions 
between the FRP case and the steel case. For the sprinklered cases there was a 12 second difference in 
the time until the critical temperature of 80°C was reached in 18% of the corridor. In both cases this 
occurred before sprinkler activation. The temperatures do however in both cases stabilize after around 
400 seconds. This may seem strange considering that the fire growth rates differ but can be explained 
by the fact that a faster growth rate will lead to an earlier activation of the sprinkler. Hence, since the 
time to sprinkler activation is shorter for the FRP case than for the steel case the HRR at the time of 
sprinkler activation is similar in the two cases in this scenario, resulting in roughly the same fire 
behavior after sprinkler activation. It should however be stated that even though the earlier sprinkler 
activation leads to a faster cooling of the gases in the corridor, critical temperatures are reached earlier 
in the FRP case which makes it a more severe case in regard to this variable. 
The differences in time until critical conditions for the visibility criteria occur were smaller than for 
the temperature criterion. Figures showed times for both the 10 m and the 5 m criteria, however, the 
discussion is based on the results from the 10 m criterion which showed a 3 second difference. The 
reason for only analyzing the 10 m criterion is based on the geometry. Since the length of the corridor 
in the setup is longer than 10 m it can be argued that it is inappropriate to allow 5 m visibility. 
Although a corridor is easy to orientate in for an evacuating person (because there are mostly only two 
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route options), it should also be possible to see emergency exit signs, which will not necessarily be the 
case if the visibility is only 5 m. 
Sprinkler activation showed some effect when it came to increasing the visibility, however the 
conditions do not improve significantly and are still critical after sprinkler activation. It should also be 
stated that sprinkler activation can contribute to a mixing of the gases in the fire room and 
consequently the smoke layer in the corridor will be affected by this as well. This means that the 
sprinkler activation could lead to a dispersion of the gases and a disappearance of the distinct smoke 
layer in the corridor. This was not accounted for in the model used and therefore the resulting visibility 
after sprinkler activation cannot be accurately predicted.   
For the unsprinklered cases there was also a difference of 12 seconds in the time until critical 
temperatures occurred. However in this scenario there is no sprinkler activation which will mean that 
there will be no decline in temperature like in the sprinklered scenario where the conditions became 
safe again after some time. In addition the difference between the conditions in the FRP and steel case 
will increase since the fire is still in the growth phase. This is due to the fact that the difference in 
HRR will increase with time since the fire growth rate differs in the two cases. The consequence of 
this is that the conditions in the unsprinklered FRP case will continue to get worse relative to the steel 
case as time goes on. 
The difference in time until critical conditions for visibility occur was for the unsprinklered cases 2 
seconds. Just as with the temperatures, there will not be a positive influence from sprinkler activation 
in this scenario. However there will be no significant increase in the relative difference between the 
FRP and steel case since the visibility at 2 m height is already very low in the early stages of the fire. 
If studying the visibility at lower heights there would most likely be a difference since the smoke layer 
will descend faster in the FRP case due to the higher HRR.  
When studying the smoke layer height it was hard to determine any differences since the variations 
between the scenarios were very small. The pictures from Smokeview show slight differences between 
the sprinklered FRP and steel cases. However, the smoke layer descends below the critical value for 
the smoke layer height before the visibility becomes critical. Hence the visibility will be the decisive 
factor when determining the time until critical conditions in regard to visibility and smoke layer 
height. This is because both of these criteria do not have to be fulfilled in order to enable safe 
evacuation, according to the criteria. Just as discussed previously about visibility in sprinklered cases, 
the mixing of gases will lead to a disappearance of the distinct smoke layer, which means that the 
figures showing the smoke layer height for the sprinklered cases are wrong. They do however hint at 
the fact that the FRP case gives denser smoke than the steel case. 
The results of the sprinklered and unsprinkered scenarios could not be directly compared since the 
burner area used in FDS varied between these scenarios. The reason for this was that the HRR is much 
lower in the sprinklered scenario which means that the burner area had to be smaller in order to 
represent a realistic fire. If an equally large burner area would have been used in this scenario the HRR 
per unit area would be too small and the flame height unrealistically low which would result in a badly 
simulated fire plume and thus false results. The difference in burner area is also the reason for the 
deviations in time until critical conditions between the sprinklered and unsprinklered scenarios. 
8.3 Growth rate sensitivity 
Unlike the soot yield parameter the sensitivity analysis that concerned the growth rate showed that the 
difference in growth rate is a highly important parameter regarding the difference of results between 
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the FRP and steel cases. Since the growth rate will determine the HRR of the fire at a given time 
during the growth phase it will have an influence on all the output variables studied. Also, the 
difference in growth rate between the FRP and steel case is a result of the added insulation that is used 
for the FRP composite structure. This means that in order to accurately compare the two structures the 
change in growth rate must be correctly determined in order to represent reality. The added insulation 
will have an effect on the growth rate but the question is “how much?”. Therefore this parameter is the 
single most important one since the effect of the added insulation is the foundation of the project and 
is modeled by varying the growth rate in the two cases. In this case the design fire that was used for 
the FRP case was reduced by studying data from a single experiment which compared two identical 
fire setups in an insulated and a non-insulated container. First of all this is a weakness since it means 
that the difference in growth rate is determined on the basis of only one experiment. Secondly the 
geometry and setup was not identical to the one used in this project, for example the compartment 
size, the fuel used and the insulating capabilities differ. It does comply fairly well with this case, but 
more representative experimental data is desirable. The reason for not performing own experiments 
was based on the cost as well as the time frame of the project. 
8.4 Geometry limitations 
A limitation in the geometry is the fact that the corridor is open at both ends. This means that the 
results are only valid for a long corridor, where no obstructions inside the corridor can accelerate the 
descent of the smoke layer. Also the model should only be used in the early stages of the fire before 
the smoke layer reaches a potentially closed door at the end of the corridor. If the corridor had been 
closed at both ends it would instead represent a scenario with shut doors. The reason for having the 
corridor open was partly to ensure that the fire would not be ventilation controlled. Another reason 
was that an open corridor can in the early stages represent another longer corridor which means that 
the model is applicable for more than just this specific case where the corridor is 21 m long. 
Another limitation is that the corridor follows a straight line. If studying a corridor with bends the gas 
flow will be different than in the model used. This could give other results following the bend 
regarding smoke layer height, visibility as well as temperatures. 
No ventilation was specified in the setup. The assumption that no smoke spread occurs through the 
ventilation system and that the ventilation was shut off after fire detection was made. However, these 
are possible scenarios that would affect the outcome. For example it could enable potential smoke 
spread to adjacent cabins unless smoke dampers are installed and functional. 
8.5 Closing discussion 
As mentioned in the report risk was defined as a combination of probability and consequences for a 
specific scenario. However the probability of a fire does in this case not depend on the building 
materials used in the construction and therefore only the consequences are compared. Since the time 
until critical condition is coupled with human safety it was used to compare the risk level of the 
different cases. The results from the FDS simulations showed some differences in time to critical 
conditions for the different variables that were studied. The times for the temperature criterion showed 
larger differences between the FRP and steel case than the times for the visibility criterion did. In both 
the sprinklered and the unsprinklered case the difference in time until critical conditions was 12 
seconds. For the 10 m visibility criterion the time differences were 3 seconds and 2 seconds for the 
sprinklered and unsprinklered scenarios respectively. However for the sprinklered cases the conditions 
stabilize at similar levels and for the temperature criterion become acceptable again after sprinkler 
activation. This is not the case in the unsprinklered scenarios where the relative difference between 
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FRP and steel increases with time and after 10 minutes reaches temperature differences of up to 
100C.  
This indicates that the risk levels for the FRP and steel cases are similar since a difference of 2-12 
seconds time until critical conditions for the different criteria is not necessarily a variation that means 
the difference between life and death for a person evacuating. This is especially true for the 
sprinklered case since the temperatures as mentioned stabilize below 80C after about 400 seconds for 
both of the sprinklered cases. However when analyzing the results more thoroughly it becomes clear 
that there is a larger difference in the time until critical conditions occur at the end of the corridor for 
the temperature criterion. This means that a larger number of people could be exposed to critical 
temperatures in the sprinklered FRP case than in the sprinklered steel case. The critical conditions are 
also maintained in the entire corridor for about twice as long in the FRP case compared to the steel 
case. For a better understanding of this Figure 6.9 can be studied. 
In a way the same reasoning applies to the unsprinklered cases. There is no large difference in the time 
until critical conditions occur but later on as the fire grows the differences in temperature between the 
FRP and steel case become significant, as previously mentioned. As in the sprinklered scenarios there 
are no large relative differences in the visibility between the FRP and steel case. 
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9 Conclusions 
The conclusions made only apply to the geometry used in this model and cases that fulfill the 
assumptions mentioned 8.4. The aim of the project was to evaluate the performance of a FRP 
composite structure compared to a steel structure in regard to fire safety and risk during an evacuation. 
This was done by investigating how the added insulation used in the FRP structure influenced the 
temperature, visibility and smoke layer height in the early stages of a fire and what effect this had on 
the risk level. The project resulted in the following conclusions being drawn: 
 The largest relative difference in time until critical conditions was found when comparing the 
gas temperature results which showed a difference of 12 seconds. 
 The visibility results show small differences in time until critical conditions, 3 seconds for the 
sprinklered case and 2 seconds for the unsprinklered case. 
 The smoke layer height was according to the FDS results similar in both cases. 
 When studying the time until critical conditions close to the fire compartment the risk levels 
are similar for the FRP and steel case. 
 If looking at the time until critical temperature conditions further away from the fire 
compartment the differences in risk level are larger. 
 The temperature differences become larger with time for the unsprinklered scenarios, after 
600 seconds the maximum difference is about 100C. 
The general conclusion is that the overall risk level is higher in the FRP case compared to the steel 
case. This is based on the fact that in a real life situation it is not only the critical conditions in the 
vicinity of the fire that are important, but also the conditions further away from the fire. In order to 
determine if the differences in risk level are significant further research with a wider scope is needed. 
The effects of the additional insulation are things that should be considered when moving from the 
traditional steel constructions to lightweight constructions like FRP.  
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10 Further research 
Some ideas on future research that could be beneficial when looking deeper into this subject is 
presented in this chapter along with an idea that could potentially help solve some of the problems 
with risk in regard to fire safety when using a FRP composite structure. 
 Since determining the difference in fire growth rate between when using a FRP composite 
structure and a steel structure was of fundamental importance it is desirable to look into this 
more thoroughly. Ideally experiments could be conducted for several different geometries and 
for different structures with varying insulation thicknesses. This would result in a better 
quantification of how much the added insulation used in the FRP case influences the fire 
growth rate which would lead to more accurate predictions on the differences in risk level. 
 
 The simulations performed in this project focus on a single geometry. It would be interesting 
to look at the effects in other types of geometries and spaces. In this way a wider 
understanding can be gained regarding the differences between the FRP and steel cases. For 
example a corridor with bends could give other results, completely different geometries like 
public spaces onboard ships could also be studied. 
 
 A possible way to reduce the risk level when using a FRP composite structure is to reduce the 
activation temperature or RTI for the sprinklers used in the compartments that are affected by 
the use of the FRP structures. This would of course not make any difference in the worst case 
scenario where sprinkler activation fails but it could still be interesting to investigate what 
effects this would have. 
 
 An investigation of how the production of chemical species, such as carbon monoxide and 
carbon dioxide, varies when using the different material setups could be performed for a more 
complete analysis of the possible difference in risk level. These values can be compared to the 
criteria for toxicity given in the IMO guidelines.  
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Appendix A: FDS Script 
Lines are marked in gray where changes between different simulations are made. This script is for 
scenario 1. 
&HEAD CHID='sprinklered_frp_finer' TITLE='sprinklered_frp_finer'/ 
&TIME T_END=900.0/ 
&MESH ID='MESH_1', MPI_PROCESS=0, IJK= 64, 120, 60, XB= 8.9, 12.1, 0.0, 6.0, 0.0, 3.0 / FIREROOM 
&MESH ID='MESH_2', MPI_PROCESS=1, IJK= 180, 24, 60, XB=-0.1,8.9,4.3,5.5,0.0,3.0/ CORRIORLEFT 
&MESH ID='MESH_3', MPI_PROCESS=2, IJK= 180, 24, 60, XB=12.1,21.1,4.3,5.5,0.0,3.0/CORRIDORRIGHT  
&MESH ID='MESH_4', MPI_PROCESS=3, IJK= 40,40,40, XB=-8.1,-0.1,0.9,8.9,0.0,8.0/LEFT AIRBOX 
&MESH ID='MESH_5', MPI_PROCESS=3, IJK= 30, 45, 30, XB=5.9,8.9,-0.2,4.3,0.0,3.0/ LEFTADJACENTR 
&MESH ID='MESH_6', MPI_PROCESS=3, IJK= 30, 45, 30, XB=12.1,15.1,-0.2,4.3,0.0,3.0/ RIGHTADJACENTR 
&MESH ID='MESH_7', MPI_PROCESS=3, IJK= 40,40,40, XB=21.1,28.1,0.9,8.9,0.0,8.0/RIGHT AIRBOX 
&MESH ID='MESH_8', MPI_PROCESS=3, IJK= 64, 4,60, XB= 8.9, 12.1, -0.2, 0.0, 0.0, 3.0/SMALLWALLMESH 
&MESH ID='MESH_9', MPI_PROCESS=3, IJK= 32, 38, 30, XB=8.9,12.1,6.0,9.8,0.0,3.0/OPPOSITEROOM 
&MESH ID='MESH_10', MPI_PROCESS=3, IJK= 32, 45, 27, XB= 8.9, 12.1, 0.0, 4.5, 3.0, 5.7/ 2NDPLANEROOM 
================== 
OPEN BOUNDARIES== 
&VENT XB=-0.1,-0.1,4.3,5.5,0.0,3.0, SURF_ID='OPEN',/ 
&VENT XB=21.1,21.1,4.3,5.5,0.0,3.0, SURF_ID='OPEN',/ 
&VENT XB=-0.1,8.9,5.5,5.5,0.0,3.0, SURF_ID='OPEN',/ 
&VENT XB=12.1,21.1,5.5,5.5,0.0,3.0, SURF_ID='OPEN',/ 
&VENT XB=-0.1,8.9,4.3,4.3,0.0,3.0, SURF_ID='OPEN',/ 
&VENT XB=12.1,21.1,4.3,4.3,0.0,3.0, SURF_ID='OPEN',/ 
 
&VENT XB=-8.1,-0.1,0.9,8.9,8.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN',/ 
&VENT XB=-8.1,-8.1,0.9,8.9,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=-8.1,-8.1,0.9,0.9,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=-8.1,-8.1,8.9,8.9,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=-0.1,-0.1,0.9,4.3,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=-0.1,-0.1,5.5,8.9,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=-0.1,-0.1,4.3,5.5,3.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
 
&VENT XB=21.1,29.1,0.9,8.9,8.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN',/ 
&VENT XB=29.1,29.1,0.9,8.9,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=29.1,29.1,0.9,0.9,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=29.1,29.1,8.9,8.9,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=21.1,21.1,0.9,4.3,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=21.1,21.1,5.5,8.9,0.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB=21.1,21.1,4.3,5.5,3.0,8.0, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
=============== 
===MATERIALS=== 
&MATL  ID='Laminate' 
 CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP='laminate_k_ramp' 
 SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP='laminate_cp_ramp' 
 DENSITY=1870.0/ [SP Report 2009:02] interpolated both 
&MATL  ID='DivinycellH80' 
 CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP='DivinycellH80_k_ramp' 
 SPECIFIC_HEAT_RAMP='DivinycellH80_cp_ramp' 
 DENSITY=80.0/ [SP Report 2009:02] interpolated both 
&MATL  ID='Firemaster' 
 CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP='Firemaster_k_ramp' 
 SPECIFIC_HEAT=0.8 
 DENSITY=100.0/ [SP Report 2009:02] interpolated conductivity, Cp constant 
&MATL  ID='Steel' 
 CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP='Steel_k_ramp' 
 SPECIFIC_HEAT=0.5 
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 DENSITY=7850.0/ [SP Report 2009:02] interpolated conductivity, Cp constant 
&MATL ID='Aluminium' 
 CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP='Aluminium_k_ramp' 
 SPECIFIC_HEAT=0.896 
 DENSITY=2707.0/  
[SFPE TAB B6], 
[http://books.google.se/books?id=1Mh9XoMoPRQC&pg=PA772&hl=sv&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q
&f=false] 
&MATL ID='RockWool' 
 CONDUCTIVITY_RAMP='RockWool_k_ramp' 
 SPECIFIC_HEAT=0.84 
 DENSITY=190/  Interpolated conductivity, Cp constant 
[http://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/thermal-conductivity-d_429.html] - conductivity  
[http://books.google.se/books?id=U3-
9vP4IDJIC&pg=PR21&lpg=PR21&dq=mineral+wool+specific+heat&source=bl&ots=nS9C2g7y_P&sig=u_zUwyru
Q4c3yl8YxdNGjdTskYU&hl=sv&sa=X&ei=TncJVIHOOcesPf6XgcAJ&ved=0CGcQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=miner
al%20wool%20specific%20heat&f=false] 
======= 
RAMPS== 
:::::::::::::::::::::::LAMINATE K RAMP:::::::::::::::::::::::::   
    
&RAMP ID='laminate_k_ramp', T= 20 ,F= 0.0425 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_k_ramp', T= 30 ,F= 0.04375 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_k_ramp', T= 40 ,F= 0.045 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_k_ramp', T= 50 ,F= 0.04625 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_k_ramp', T= 60 ,F= 0.0475 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_k_ramp', T= 70 ,F= 0.04875 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_k_ramp', T= 80 ,F= 0.05 / 
:::::::::::::::::::::::LAMINATE Cp RAMP:::::::::::::::::::::::::   
    
&RAMP ID='laminate_cp_ramp', T= 20 ,F= 0.7425 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_cp_ramp', T= 30 ,F= 0.74375 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_cp_ramp', T= 40 ,F= 0.745 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_cp_ramp', T= 50 ,F= 0.74625 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_cp_ramp', T= 60 ,F= 0.7475 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_cp_ramp', T= 70 ,F= 0.74875 / 
&RAMP ID='laminate_cp_ramp', T= 80 ,F= 0.75 / 
::::::::::::::::::::::: Divinycell Core H80 K RAMP:::::::::::::::::::::::::   
    
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_k_ramp', T= 20 ,F= 0.029 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_k_ramp', T= 30 ,F= 0.028702722 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_k_ramp', T= 40 ,F= 0.028703444 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_k_ramp', T= 50 ,F= 0.028704167 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_k_ramp', T= 60 ,F= 0.028704889 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_k_ramp', T= 70 ,F= 0.028705611 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_k_ramp', T= 80 ,F= 0.028706333 / 
::::::::::::::::::::::: Divinycell Core H80 Cp RAMP:::::::::::::::::::::::::   
    
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_cp_ramp', T= 20 ,F= 2.12 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_cp_ramp', T= 30 ,F= 2.163333333 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_cp_ramp', T= 40 ,F= 2.206666667 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_cp_ramp', T= 50 ,F= 2.25 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_cp_ramp', T= 60 ,F= 2.293333333 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_cp_ramp', T= 70 ,F= 2.336666667 / 
&RAMP ID='DivinycellH80_cp_ramp', T= 80 ,F= 2.38 / 
::::::::::::::::::::::: Firemaster K RAMP:::::::::::::::::::::::::   
    
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 20 ,F= 0.0335 / 
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&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 30 ,F= 0.034 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 40 ,F= 0.0345 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 50 ,F= 0.035 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 60 ,F= 0.037 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 70 ,F= 0.039 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 80 ,F= 0.041 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 90 ,F= 0.043 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 100 ,F= 0.045 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 110 ,F= 0.0466 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 120 ,F= 0.0482 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 130 ,F= 0.0498 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 140 ,F= 0.0514 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 150 ,F= 0.053 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 160 ,F= 0.055 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 170 ,F= 0.057 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 180 ,F= 0.059 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 190 ,F= 0.061 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 200 ,F= 0.063 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 210 ,F= 0.0655 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 220 ,F= 0.068 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 230 ,F= 0.0705 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 240 ,F= 0.073 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 250 ,F= 0.0755 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 260 ,F= 0.078 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 270 ,F= 0.0805 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 280 ,F= 0.083 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 290 ,F= 0.0855 / 
&RAMP ID='Firemaster_k_ramp', T= 300 ,F= 0.088 / 
::::::::::::::::::::::: Steel K RAMP:::::::::::::::::::::::::    
   
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 20 ,F= 60 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 30 ,F= 59.57692308 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 40 ,F= 59.15384615 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 50 ,F= 58.73076923 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 60 ,F= 58.30769231 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 70 ,F= 57.88461538 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 80 ,F= 57.46153846 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 90 ,F= 57.03846154 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 100 ,F= 56.61538462 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 110 ,F= 56.19230769 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 120 ,F= 55.76923077 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 130 ,F= 55.34615385 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 140 ,F= 54.92307692 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 150 ,F= 54.5 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 160 ,F= 54.07692308 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 170 ,F= 53.65384615 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 180 ,F= 53.23076923 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 190 ,F= 52.80769231 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 200 ,F= 52.38461538 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 210 ,F= 51.96153846 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 220 ,F= 51.53846154 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 230 ,F= 51.11538462 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 240 ,F= 50.69230769 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 250 ,F= 50.26923077 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 260 ,F= 49.84615385 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 270 ,F= 49.42307692 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 280 ,F= 49 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 290 ,F= 48.57692308 / 
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&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 300 ,F= 48.15384615 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 310 ,F= 47.73076923 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 320 ,F= 47.30769231 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 330 ,F= 46.88461538 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 340 ,F= 46.46153846 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 350 ,F= 46.03846154 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 360 ,F= 45.61538462 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 370 ,F= 45.19230769 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 380 ,F= 44.76923077 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 390 ,F= 44.34615385 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 400 ,F= 43.92307692 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 410 ,F= 43.5 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 420 ,F= 43.07692308 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 430 ,F= 42.65384615 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 440 ,F= 42.23076923 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 450 ,F= 41.80769231 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 460 ,F= 41.38461538 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 470 ,F= 40.96153846 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 480 ,F= 40.53846154 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 490 ,F= 40.11538462 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 500 ,F= 39.69230769 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 510 ,F= 39.26923077 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 520 ,F= 38.84615385 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 530 ,F= 38.42307692 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 540 ,F= 38 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 550 ,F= 37.57692308 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 560 ,F= 37.15384615 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 570 ,F= 36.73076923 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 580 ,F= 36.30769231 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 590 ,F= 35.88461538 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 600 ,F= 35.46153846 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 610 ,F= 35.03846154 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 620 ,F= 34.61538462 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 630 ,F= 34.19230769 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 640 ,F= 33.76923077 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 650 ,F= 33.34615385 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 660 ,F= 32.92307692 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 670 ,F= 32.5 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 680 ,F= 32.07692308 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 690 ,F= 31.65384615 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 700 ,F= 31.23076923 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 710 ,F= 30.80769231 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 720 ,F= 30.38461538 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 730 ,F= 29.96153846 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 740 ,F= 29.53846154 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 750 ,F= 29.11538462 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 760 ,F= 28.69230769 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 770 ,F= 28.26923077 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 780 ,F= 27.84615385 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 790 ,F= 27.42307692 / 
&RAMP ID='Steel_k_ramp', T= 800 ,F= 27 / 
::::::::::::::::::::::: RockWool K RAMP::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 20 ,F= 0.049754955 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 37.8 ,F= 0.052 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 40 ,F= 0.052277477 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 60 ,F= 0.0548 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 80 ,F= 0.057322523 / 
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&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 93.3 ,F= 0.059 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 100 ,F= 0.059964029 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 120 ,F= 0.062841727 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 140 ,F= 0.065719424 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 148.9 ,F= 0.067 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 160 ,F= 0.0688 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 180 ,F= 0.072043243 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 200 ,F= 0.075286486 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 204.4 ,F= 0.076 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 220 ,F= 0.079086331 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 240 ,F= 0.083043165 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 260 ,F= 0.087 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 280 ,F= 0.091316547 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 300 ,F= 0.095633094 / 
&RAMP ID='RockWool_k_ramp', T= 315.6 ,F= 0.099 / 
 
 
::::::::::::::::::::::: ALUMINIUM K RAMP:::::::::::::::::::::::::   
    
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 20 ,F= 202.8 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 40 ,F= 203.6 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 60 ,F= 204.4 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 80 ,F= 205.2 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 100 ,F= 206 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 120 ,F= 207.8 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 140 ,F= 209.6 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 160 ,F= 211.4 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 180 ,F= 213.2 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 200 ,F= 215 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 220 ,F= 217.6 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 240 ,F= 220.2 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 260 ,F= 222.8 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 280 ,F= 225.4 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 300 ,F= 228 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 320 ,F= 232.2 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 340 ,F= 236.4 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 360 ,F= 240.6 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 380 ,F= 244.8 / 
&RAMP ID='Aluminium_k_ramp', T= 400 ,F= 249 / 
 
SURF=== 
===unexposed backing==== 
&SURF ID= 'B-class panel', COLOR='BLUE', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, MATL_ID='Steel','Firemaster','Steel', 
THICKNESS=0.0007,0.0486,0.0007/ symmetric 
&SURF ID= 'FRP inside', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Firemaster','Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate', THICKNESS=0.1,001,0.05,0.001/ 
&SURF ID= 'FRP outside', COLOR='RED' TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate','Firemaster', THICKNESS=0.001,0.05,0.001,0.1/ 
&SURF ID= 'FLOOR+CEILING_upwards', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Firemaster','Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate','RockWool','Aluminium', 
THICKNESS=0.1,0.001,0.05,0.001,0.02,0.002/ 
&SURF ID= 'FLOOR+CEILING_downwards', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Aluminium','RockWool','Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate','Firemaster', 
THICKNESS=0.002,0.02,0.001,0.05,0.001,0.1/ 
====backing exposed==== 
&SURF ID= 'B-class panel_exp', COLOR='BLUE', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, MATL_ID='Steel','Firemaster','Steel', 
THICKNESS=0.0007,0.0486,0.0007, BACKING='EXPOSED'/ symmetric 
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&SURF ID= 'FRP inside_exp', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Firemaster','Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate', THICKNESS=0.1,001,0.05,0.001, 
BACKING='EXPOSED'/ 
&SURF ID= 'FRP outside_exp', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate','Firemaster', THICKNESS=0.001,0.05,0.001,0.1, 
BACKING='EXPOSED'/ 
&SURF ID= 'FLOOR+CEILING_upwards_exp', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Firemaster','Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate','RockWool','Aluminium', 
THICKNESS=0.1,0.001,0.05,0.001,0.02,0.002, BACKING='EXPOSED'/ 
&SURF ID= 'FLOOR+CEILING_downwards_exp', COLOR='RED', TRANSPARENCY=0.2, 
MATL_ID='Aluminium','RockWool','Laminate','DivinycellH80','Laminate','Firemaster' 
THICKNESS=0.002,0.02,0.001,0.05,0.001,0.1, BACKING='EXPOSED'/ 
   
==================================== 
Geometry 1st floor== 
&OBST XB=0.0,9.0,5.5,5.5,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class panel','INERT','INERT'/ 
longside corridor 1.1 
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,5.5,5.5,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel_exp','B-class 
panel_exp','INERT','INERT'/ longside corridor 1.2 
&OBST XB=12.0,21.0,5.5,5.5,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class 
panel','INERT','INERT'/ longside corridor 1.3 
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,9.8,9.8,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel_exp','B-class 
panel_exp','INERT','INERT'/ shortside room other sidde 
&OBST XB=9.0,9.0,5.5,9.8,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel','B-class panel','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ 
side room other side 
&OBST XB=12.0,12.0,5.5,9.8,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel','B-class 
panel','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ side room other side  
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,5.5,9.8,0.0,0.0,  
SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','FLOOR+CEILING_upwards','FLOOR+CEILING_downwards'/ floor 
other side 
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,5.5,9.8,2.7,2.7,  
SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','FLOOR+CEILING_upwards','FLOOR+CEILING_downwards'/ outer 
ceiling other side 
&OBST XB=0.0,9.0,4.3,4.3,0.0,2.7,   SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class panel','INERT','INERT'/ 
longside corridor 2.1 
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,4.3,4.3,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel_exp','B-class 
panel_exp','INERT','INERT'/ longside corridor 2.2 ___Backing exposed  
&OBST XB=12.0,21.0,4.3,4.3,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class 
panel','INERT','INERT', / longside corridor 2.3  
&OBST XB=6.0,6.0,-0.2,4.3,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel','B-class panel','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ 
cabin dividing wall 1  
&OBST XB=9.0,9.0,-0.2,4.3,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel_exp','B-class 
panel_exp','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ cabin dividing wall  2 ___Backing exposed  
&OBST XB=12.0,12.0,-0.2,4.3,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel_exp','B-class 
panel_exp','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ cabin dividing wall  3 ___Backing exposed  
&OBST XB=15.0,15.0,-0.2,4.3,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel','B-class 
panel','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ cabin wall 4 
&OBST XB=6.0,15.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,2.7, BNDF_OBST=.TRUE., SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel_exp','B-
class panel_exp','INERT','INERT'/ cabin shortsidewall 
&OBST XB=6.0,15.0,-0.2,-0.2,0.0,2.7, BNDF_OBST=.TRUE., SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','FRP outside','FRP 
inside','INERT','INERT'/cabin shortside wall outer 
&OBST XB=0.0,21.0,4.3,5.5,2.7,2.7,  
SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','FLOOR+CEILING_upwards','FLOOR+CEILING_downwards'/ 
bigroof 
&OBST XB=6.0,15.0,-0.2,4.3,2.7,2.7,  
SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','FLOOR+CEILING_upwards_exp','FLOOR+CEILING_downwards_e
xp'/ littleroof 
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&OBST XB=0.0,21.0,4.3,5.5,0.0,0.0,  
SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','FLOOR+CEILING_upwards','FLOOR+CEILING_downwards'/ 
bigfloor 
&OBST XB=6.0,15.0,-0.2,4.3,0.0,0.0,  
SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','FLOOR+CEILING_upwards','FLOOR+CEILING_downwards'/ 
littlefloor 
 
&OBST XB=0.0,0.0,4.3,5.5,2.1,2.7,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel','B-class panel','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ 
leftsideceilingconnector 
&OBST XB=21.0,21.0,4.3,5.5,2.1,2.7, SURF_ID6='B-class panel','B-class panel','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ 
rightsideceilingconnector 
 
&OBST XB=10.8,10.8,2.5,4.3,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel_exp','B-class 
panel_exp','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ toilet longside 
&OBST XB=10.8,12.0,2.5,2.5,0.0,2.7,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel_exp','B-class 
panel_exp','INERT','INERT'/ toilet shortside 
 
&HOLE XB=9.5,10.3,4.0,4.5,0.0,2.0/ door cabin 4 (mitten) 
&HOLE XB=10.8,10.9,3.4,3.5,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 toilet door chink 
&HOLE XB=1.5,1.6,4.2,4.4,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 1 
&HOLE XB=4.5,4.6,4.2,4.4,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 2 
&HOLE XB=7.5,7.6,4.2,4.4,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 3 
&HOLE XB=13.5,13.6,4.2,4.4,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 5 
&HOLE XB=16.5,16.6,4.2,4.4,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 6 
&HOLE XB=19.5,19.6,4.2,4.4,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 7 
&HOLE XB=2.1,2.2,5.4,5.6,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 8 
&HOLE XB=5.1,5.2,5.4,5.6,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 9 
&HOLE XB=8.1,8.2,5.4,5.6,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 10 
&HOLE XB=11.1,11.2,5.4,5.6,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 11 
&HOLE XB=14.1,14.2,5.4,5.6,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 12 
&HOLE XB=17.1,17.2,5.4,5.6,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 13 
&HOLE XB=20.1,20.2,5.4,5.6,0.0,0.1/ 0.0125*1 m2 door chink cabin 14 
 
INNER CEILING=== 
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,-0.2,4.3,2.1,2.1, SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','B-class panel_exp','B-class 
panel_exp'/ Middle cabin 
&OBST XB=6.0,9.0,-0.2,4.3,2.1,2.1,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class panel'/ 
Left cabin 
&OBST XB=12.0,15.0,-0.2,4.3,2.1,2.1,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class 
panel'/ right cabin 
&OBST XB=0.0,21.0,4.3,5.5,2.1,2.1, SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class panel'/ 
corridor 
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,5.5,9.8,2.1,2.1, SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class panel'/ 
other side 
 
ONLY IN UNSPRINKLERED CASES: 
 ==CEILING COLLAPSE – TIME DEPENDENT OPENING======================== 
&HOLE XB=9.0,12.0,0.0,4.3,2.0,2.2, DEVC_ID='collapse_timer', COLOR='YELLOW', 
TRANSPARENCY=0.2/ceiling collapses 
&DEVC XYZ=10.5,2.15,2.1, ID='collapse_timer', SETPOINT=420.0, QUANTITY='TIME', 
INITIAL_STATE=.FALSE./timer for ceiling collapse (time dependent on HRR) 
 
=========== 
==2nd floor== 
&OBST XB=9.0,9.0,0.0,4.3,2.7,5.4,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel','B-class panel','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ 
cabin wall1   
&OBST XB=12.0,12.0,0.0,4.3,2.7,5.4,  SURF_ID6='B-class panel','B-class 
panel','INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT'/ cabin wall 2  
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&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,4.3,4.3,2.7,5.4,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class panel','INERT','INERT'/ 
cabinwall 3 
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,0.0,0.0,2.7,5.4,  SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','B-class panel','B-class panel','INERT','INERT'/ 
cabinwall 4 
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,0.0,4.3,5.4,5.4,  
SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','FLOOR+CEILING_upwards_exp','FLOOR+CEILING_downwards_e
xp'/cabin outter ceiling 
&OBST XB=9.0,12.0,0.0,4.3,4.8,4.8, SURF_ID6='INERT','INERT','INERT','INERT','B-class panel_exp','B-class 
panel_exp'/ cabin inner ceiling 
================================== 
===BRAND==== 
&OBST XB= 10.35,10.65,1.15,1.45, 0.0, 0.0, SURF_IDS='BURNER','INERT','INERT' / 
&REAC  FUEL='MYFUEL' 
 SOOT_YIELD=0.067 
 CO_YIELD=0.045 
 IDEAL=.TRUE. 
 C=1 
 H=1.6 
 O=0.2 
 HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=26376/ 
&SURF ID='BURNER', 
      COLOR='RED', 
      HRRPUA=2098.765, 
      RAMP_Q='RAMP_HRR'/ 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 0 , F= 0 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 10 , F= 0.002500001 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 20 , F= 0.010000002 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 30 , F= 0.022500005 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 40 , F= 0.040000008 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 50 , F= 0.062500013 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 60 , F= 0.090000019 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 70 , F= 0.122500025 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 80 , F= 0.160000033 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 90 , F= 0.202500042 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 100 , F= 0.250000051 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 110 , F= 0.302500062 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 120 , F= 0.360000074 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 130 , F= 0.422500087 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 140 , F= 0.490000101 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 150 , F= 0.562500116 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 160 , F= 0.640000132 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 170 , F= 0.722500149 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 180 , F= 0.810000167 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 190 , F= 0.902500186 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 200 , F= 1.000000206 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 260 , F= 1 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 320 , F= 0.333333333 / 
&RAMP ID='RAMP_HRR', T= 900 , F= 0.333333333 / 
 
============ 
===DEVICES= 
 
::::::::::::::::::::FIRE THERMOCOUPLES:::::::::::::::::::::::::   
       
&DEVC  ID='FireTC 1  ', XYZ= 10.5 , 1.3 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='FireTC 2  ', XYZ= 10.5 , 1.3 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='FireTC 3  ', XYZ= 10.5 , 1.3 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='FireTC 4  ', XYZ= 10.5 , 1.3 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
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&DEVC  ID='FireTC 5  ', XYZ= 10.5 , 1.3 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='FireTC 6  ', XYZ= 10.5 , 1.3 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
::::::::::::::::::DOOR THERMOCOUPLES:::::::::::::::::::::::      
      
&DEVC  ID='DoorTC 1  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorTC 2  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorTC 3  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorTC 4  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorTC 5  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorTC 6  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
::::::::::::::::::CORRIDOR B THERMOCOUPLES:::::::::::::::::::::::    
       
&DEVC  ID='CorridorBTC 1  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.9 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorBTC 2  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.9 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorBTC 3  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.9 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorBTC 4  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.9 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorBTC 5  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.9 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorBTC 6  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.9 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
::::::::::::::::::CORRIDOR A THERMOCOUPLES:::::::::::::::::::::::    
    
&DEVC  ID='CorridorATC 1  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorATC 2  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorATC 3  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorATC 4  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorATC 5  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorATC 6  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
::::::::::::::::::CORRIDOR C THERMOCOUPLES:::::::::::::::::::::::    
    
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTC 1  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTC 2  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTC 3  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTC 4  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTC 5  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTC 6  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
::::::::::::::::DOOR VELOCITY:::::::::::::::::::::::          
&DEVC  ID='DoorVelo 1  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='V-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorVelo 2  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='V-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorVelo 3  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='V-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorVelo 4  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='V-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorVelo 5  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='V-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='DoorVelo 6  ', XYZ= 9.9 , 4.3 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='V-VELOCITY' / 
::::::::::::::::::CORRIDOR A VELOCITY:::::::::::::::::::::::      
       
&DEVC  ID='CorridorAVelo 1  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorAVelo 2  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorAVelo 3  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorAVelo 4  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorAVelo 5  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorAVelo 6  ', XYZ= 4.9 , 4.9 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
::::::::::::::::::CORRIDOR C VELOCITY:::::::::::::::::::::::      
      / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTVelo 1  ', XYZ= 18 , 4.9 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTVelo 2  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTVelo 3  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTVelo 4  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTVelo 5  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
&DEVC  ID='CorridorCTVelo 6  ', XYZ= 19.9 , 4.9 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY' / 
::::::::::::::::::ADJACENT ROOM A::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
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-Wall-            
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAW1_TC  ', XYZ= 8.9 , 2.1 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAW2_TC  ', XYZ= 8.9 , 2.1 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAW3_TC  ', XYZ= 8.9 , 2.1 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAW4_TC  ', XYZ= 8.9 , 2.1 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAW5_TC  ', XYZ= 8.9 , 2.1 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAW6_TC  ', XYZ= 8.9 , 2.1 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
-Center- 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAC1_TC  ', XYZ= 7.5 , 2.1 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAC2_TC  ', XYZ= 7.5 , 2.1 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAC3_TC  ', XYZ= 7.5 , 2.1 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAC4_TC  ', XYZ= 7.5 , 2.1 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAC5_TC  ', XYZ= 7.5 , 2.1 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMAC6_TC  ', XYZ= 7.5 , 2.1 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
::::::::::::::::::ADJACENT ROOM B:::::::::::::::::::::::::::       
  
-Wall    
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBW1_TC  ', XYZ= 12.1 , 2.1 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBW2_TC  ', XYZ= 12.1 , 2.1 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBW3_TC  ', XYZ= 12.1 , 2.1 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBW4_TC  ', XYZ= 12.1 , 2.1 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBW5_TC  ', XYZ= 12.1 , 2.1 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBW6_TC  ', XYZ= 12.1 , 2.1 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
-Center- 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBC1_TC  ', XYZ= 13.5 , 2.1 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBC2_TC  ', XYZ= 13.5 , 2.1 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBC3_TC  ', XYZ= 13.5 , 2.1 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBC4_TC  ', XYZ= 13.5 , 2.1 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBC5_TC  ', XYZ= 13.5 , 2.1 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMBC6_TC  ', XYZ= 13.5 , 2.1 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
::::::::::::SECOND FLOOR:::::: 
&DEVC  ID='SecFloor1_TC', XYZ= 10.5 , 2.1 , 4.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='SecFloor2_TC', XYZ= 10.5 , 2.1 , 4.55 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='SecFloor3_TC', XYZ= 10.5 , 2.1 , 4.3 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='SecFloor4_TC', XYZ= 10.5 , 2.1 , 4.05 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='SecFloor5_TC', XYZ= 10.5 , 2.1 , 3.8 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='SecFloor6_TC', XYZ= 10.5 , 2.1 , 3.4 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
- 
&DEVC  ID='SecFloor7_TC', XYZ= 10.5 , 2.1 , 2.8 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='SecFloor8_TC', XYZ= 10.5 , 2.1 , 3.0 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='SecFloor9_TC', XYZ= 10.5 , 2.1 , 3.2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
::::::::::::::::::ADJACENT ROOM C- over the corridor:::::::::::::::::::::::::::  
       
-Wall    
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMC1_TC  ', XYZ= 11.1 , 5.6 , 2 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMC2_TC  ', XYZ= 11.1 , 5.6 , 1.85 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMC3_TC  ', XYZ= 11.1 , 5.6 , 1.6 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMC4_TC  ', XYZ= 11.1 , 5.6 , 1.35 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMC5_TC  ', XYZ= 11.1 , 5.6 , 1.1 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
&DEVC  ID='ADROOMC6_TC  ', XYZ= 11.1 , 5.6 , 0.7 ,  QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE' / 
 
 
============ 
SLiceFiles== 
 
&SLCF PBY=4.9, QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY'/ 
&SLCF PBY=4.9, QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE'/ 
&SLCF PBX=10.5, QUANTITY='V-VELOCITY'/ 
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&SLCF PBX=10.5, QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE'/ 
&SLCF PBY=1.3, QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE'/ 
&SLCF PBY=1.3, QUANTITY='U-VELOCITY'/ 
&SLCF PBZ=1.81, QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE'/ 
&SLCF PBZ=9.9, QUANTITY='VISIBILITY'/ 
&SLCF PBZ=10.5, QUANTITY='VISIBILITY'/ 
&SLCF PBZ=5.2, QUANTITY='VISIBILITY'/ 
&SLCF PBZ=15.8, QUANTITY='VISIBILITY'/ 
&SLCF PBY=4.9, QUANTITY='VISIBILITY'/ 
&SLCF PBY=-0.1, QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE'/ 
&SLCF PBY=-0.1, QUANTITY='VELOCITY'/ 
============== 
RADIATION===== 
&RADI RADIATIVE_FRACTION=0.262/  
 
================== 
BOUNDARY FILES==== 
&BNDF QUANTITY='INCIDENT HEAT FLUX'/ 
&BNDF QUANTITY='WALL TEMPERATURE'/ 
 
============= 
MISC======== 
 
&MISC TMPA=20, BNDF_DEFAULT=.FALSE./ 
 
&TAIL/ 
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Appendix B: Material data 
 
Figure  B.1. Ramp for conductivity for non-metal materials.
 
Figure  B.2. Ramp for conductivity for metal materials. 
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Figure  B.3. Ramp for specific heat capacity for non-metal materials. 
 
Figure  B.4. Ramp (constant) for specific heat capacity for metal materials. 
Table  B.1. Density used for materials. 
Material Density [kg/m
3
] 
Laminate (on FRP wall) 1870 
DivinycellH80 (FRP wall core) 80 
Firemaster insulation 100 
Steel 7850 
Aluminium 2707 
Rockwool insulation 190 
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Table  B.2. References for presented material properties. 
 
  
Material Density reference Specific heat capacity 
reference 
Conductivity 
reference 
Laminate  
(on FRP wall) 
(Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 2009) (Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 
2009) 
(Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 
2009) 
DivinycellH80 
(FRP wall core) 
(Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 2009) (Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 
2009) 
(Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 
2009) 
Firemaster 
insulation 
(Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 2009) (Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 
2009) 
(Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 
2009) 
Steel (Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 2009) (Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 
2009) 
(Tuovinen & Hertzberg, 
2009) 
Aluminium Table B-1 in 
(Eckert & Drake, 1987) 
Table B-1 in 
(Eckert & Drake, 1987) 
Table B-1 in 
(Eckert & Drake, 1987) 
Rockwool 
insulation 
(Mineral wool) 
(Hens, 2012, p.xxi) (Hens, 2012, p.xxi) (Engineering Toolbox, 
2014) 
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Appendix C: Backing exposed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure  C.1. Constructions with backing exposed are marked with black arrows. 2D view from side. 
Figure  C.2. Constructions with backing exposed are marked with black arrows. 3D view, parts of the 
geometry are cut off . 
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Appendix D: Fire input data 
Table D.1. Assumed material leading to values for soot yield, given materials from experiment by Arvidson et al. 
(2008). 
Items of interior * Combustible 
mass [kg] * 
Material ys Weighted ys 
Walls (PVC foil) 6,1 PVC 0,172± 0,006582 
Ceiling (PVC foil) 2,8 PVC 0,172± 0,003021 
Floor (PVC carpet) 38,1 PVC flooring 0,028 0,006693 
Foam mattresses 6,4 PU 0,230 0,009235 
Spring mattresses 13,4 POLYESTER 0,090± 0,007566 
Bedding mattresses 5,9 POLYESTER 0,090± 0,003331 
Sheets 2,1 POLYESTER 0,090± 0,001186 
Quilts 5 PE FOAMS 0,100± 0,003137 
Quilt cases 2,5 POLYESTER 0,090± 0,001412 
Pillows 2,3 PE FOAMS 0,100± 0,001443 
Pillow cases 0,3 POLYESTER 0,090± 0,000169 
Chair 1,5 WOOD 0,015 0,000141 
Table 14,4 WOOD 0,015 0,001355 
Hat rack 1 WOOD 0,015 9,41E-05 
Decorative bars 3,7 WOOD 0,015 0,000348 
Coats 4,6 POLYESTER 0,090± 0,002597 
Large suitcases (PE) 12,2 PE 0,060± 0,004592 
Medium suitcases (PE) 9,8 PE 0,060± 0,003689 
Large suitcases (Clothes) 16 POLYESTER 0,090± 0,009034 
Medium suitcases 
(Clothes) 
11,3 COTTON 
(CELLULOSA) 
0,025 0,001772 
 159,4   0,067397 
* (Arvidson et al., 2008). 
± Values from table 3-4.14 (Tewardson, 2002). 
 Value from (Wade, 2001). 
 Values from table 9.2 (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). 
 Value from table 7 (Robbins & Wade, 2007). 
 
 Table D.2. Assumed materials leading to values for heat of combustion, and radiative fraction. 
* Assumed value, since most materials range from 0.1-0.4 for fuels with low soot production (Drysdale, 2011). 
± Value from table 1.13 (Drysdale, 2011). 
 Values from table 3-4.14 (Tewardson, 2002). 
 
Material Mass [kg] ΔHc 
[kJ/kg] 
Weighted 
ΔHc [kJ/kg] 
ΔHrad [kJ/kg] χr Weighted χr 
PVC 8,9 16400 916 2600 0,16 0,009 
PVC (flooring) 38,1 16400 3920 2600 0,16 0,038 
PU (GM23) 6,4 27200 1092 8700 0,32 0,013 
POLYESTER 44,8 32500 9134 9800 0,30 0,085 
PE FOAM 7,3 40800 1869 15500 0,38 0,017 
WOOD 20,6 17700 2287 4600 0,26 0,034 
PE 22,0 43600 6018 16600 0,38 0,053 
COTTON 11,3 16090± 1141 - 0,20* 0,014 
 159,4  26376   0,262 
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Table  D.3. Assumed materials leading to coefficiencts of C, H, O and N. 
Material Combustible 
mass [kg] 
Coefficients* Weighted Coefficients 
C H O N C H O N 
PVC 8.9 1 1.5 0 0 1 0.084 0 0 
PVC flooring (PVC) 38.1 1 1.5 0 0 1 0.359 0 0 
PU (GM23) 6.4 1 1.8 0.35 0.06 1 0.072 0.014 0.002 
POLYESTER 44.8 1 1.4 0.22 0 1 0.393 0.062 0 
POLYETHYLENE 
FOAMS± 
7.3 1 2 0 0 1 0.092 0 0 
WOOD 20.6 1 1.7 0.72 0 1 0.22 0.093 0 
PE 22 1 2 0 0 1 0.276 0 0 
COTTON 11.3 1 1.7 0.72 0 1 0.121 0.051 0 
 159.4     1 1.6 0.2 0.002 
* Values in column from table 3-4.13 (Tewardson, 2002). 
± Material assumed equal to “PE” in table 3-4.13 (Tewardson, 2002) 
 Material assumed equal to “red oak” in table 3-4.13 (Tewardson, 2002)  
Table  D.4. Assumed material leading to values for CO-yield. 
Material Combustible mass yCO
* Weighted  yCO  
PVC 8.9 0.063 0.003518 
PVC flooring (PVC) 38.1 0.063 0.015058 
PU (GM23) 6.4 0.031 0.001245 
POLYESTER 44.8 0.07 0.019674 
POLYETHYLENE FOAMS 7.3 0.026 0.001191 
WOOD 20.6 0.004 0.000517 
PE 22 0.024 0.003312 
COTTON 11.3 0.004 0.000284 
 159.4  0.045 
* Values in column from table 3-4.14 (Tewardson, 2002).  
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Appendix E: FDS5 and FDS6 comparison 
 
 
Figure  E.1. Transient velocity output in measure point A from FDS 5 and FDS 6.
 
Figure  E.2. Transient velocity output in measure point D from FDS 5 and FDS 6. 
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Figure  E.3. Transient temperature output in measure point A from FDS 5 and FDS 6. 
 
Figure  E.4. Transient velocity output in measure point D from FDS 5 and FDS 6. 
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Figure  E.5. Transient temperature output in measure point K from FDS 5 and FDS 6. 
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Appendix F: Grid independence 
This appendix is divided into several sections in order to make the observations from the different 
device trees distinguishable.  
Velocity probe tree in point D 
All graph lines from the medium case, except the ones for the lowest point (0.7 m), follow the fine 
case well. The lines from the lowest device point have a good fit regarding magnitude and shape until 
approximately 430 seconds. After this time it is possible to distinguish a better fit between the coarse 
and fine cases than in the medium and fine cases. See graphs in Figure  F.1 - Figure  F.6. 
Thermocouple tree in point D 
All lines have a similar shape, except by the lowest device point. At this point (0.7 m) the fine case 
reaches higher temperatures earlier than the other two cases. The magnitudes for devices placed at 2 m 
are more similar for the coarse and fine cases than for the medium and fine cases. However, for 
devices at heights 1.85-1.1 m the medium is a better fit. For devices at heights 1.85-0.7 m following 
observations are made: 
 The temperatures for the medium case differentiate 0-50 C from the fine cases, except in the 
lowest point (0.7 m) where the difference is several hundred degrees. 
 The temperatures from the coarse case differentiate 50-150C from the fine case, except in the 
lowest point (0.7 m) where the difference is several hundred degrees. 
See graphs in Figure  F.7 - Figure  F.12. 
Profiles in point D 
The temperature and velocity profiles for trees point A can be seen in Figure  F.13 and Figure  F.14. 
What can be observed is that the velocity profiles for the medium and fine cases have a good fit, 
whereas the temperature profiles are more deviating. The temperatures for highest and lowest devices 
differentiate about 150C respectively 400C for medium and fine temperatures. For the rest of the 
heights, the differences are in the vicinity of 30-100C.   
 
 
Figure  F.1. Velocity in measurepoint D, H=2.0 m. 
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Figure  F.2. Velocity in measurepoint D, H=1.85 m. 
 
Figure  F.3. Velocity in measurepoint D, H=1.60 m. 
 
Figure  F.4. Velocity in measurepoint D, H=1.35 m. 
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Figure  F.5. Velocity in measurepoint D, H=1.10 m. 
 
Figure  F.6. Velocity in measurepoint D, H=0.70 m. 
 
Figure  F.7. Temperature in measurepoint D, H=2.0 m. 
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Figure  F.8. Temperature in measurepoint D, H=1.85 m. 
 
Figure  F.9. Temperature in measurepoint D, H=1.60 m. 
 
Figure  F.10. Temperature in measurepoint D, H=1.35 m. 
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Figure  F.11. Temperature in measurepoint D, H=1.10 m. 
 
Figure  F.12. Temperature in measurepoint D, H=0.70 m. 
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Figure  F.13. Temperature profile at 600 s, measurepoint D. 
 
Figure  F.14. Velocity profile at 600 s, measurepoint D. 
Velocity probe tree in point A 
The lines for the fine and medium cases have similar shapes and the magnitudes are similar except for 
the lowest height point (0.7 m), and the two highest points. The coarse differentiates more in both 
shape and magnitude for all heights, except the two highest points. See graphs in Figure  F.15 - Figure  
F.20. 
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Thermocouple tree in point A 
The medium and fine cases have similar shapes and magnitudes on all heights. The only exception is 
on height 1.10 m where the difference in magnitude is 50C. See graphs in Figure  F.21 - Figure  F.26. 
Profiles point A 
The temperature and velocity profiles for trees point A can be seen in Figure  F.27 and Figure  F.28. 
Not much can be concluded by looking at the velocity profile. Both medium and coarse cases are in 
total equally deviating from the fine case. However, the temperature profiles shows that medium has 
both better fit to the fine case regarding shape and magnitude compared to the coarse case. The highest 
differences to the fine case lies around 30C for the fine, whilst coarse differences lies around 50C 
 
 
Figure  F.15. Velocity in measurepoint A, H=2.00 m. 
 
Figure  F.16. Velocity in measurepoint A, H=1.85 m. 
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Figure  F.17. Velocity in measurepoint A, H=1.60 m. 
 
Figure  F.18. Velocity in measurepoint A, H=1.35 m. 
 
Figure  F.19. Velocity in measurepoint A, H=1.10 m. 
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Figure  F.20. Velocity in measurepoint A, H=0.70 m. 
 
Figure  F.21. Temperature in measurepoint A, H=2.00 m. 
 
Figure  F.22. Temperature in measurepoint A, H=1.85 m. 
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Figure  F.23. Temperature in measurepoint A, H=1.60 m. 
 
Figure  F.24. Temperature in measurepoint A, H=1.35 m. 
 
Figure  F.25. Temperature in measurepoint A, H=1.10 m. 
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Figure  F.26. Temperature in measurepoint A, H=0.70 m. 
 
Figure  F.27. Velocity profile at 600 s, measurepoint A. 
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Figure  F.28. Temperature profile at 600 s, measurepoint A. 
 
Fire 
Instantaneous pictures of the slice files in the fire enclosure are rendered for times 50-, 150- and 600 
seconds for each of the cases medium, coarse and fine. 
Looking at Figure  F.29 - Figure  F.37 it is possible to distinguish a better resolution of the 
temperatures in the flow field as the grid size decreases. In the fine case there is a high resolution and 
the turbulence is accentuated in the fire room. In the medium case there is a smoothening of this 
resolution, while in the coarse case the temperatures are more uniform within the fire enclosure due to 
the large size of the cells which results in low deviations in temperature. 
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Figure  F.29. The coarse fire temperatures after 50s. 
 
Figure  F.30. The coarse fire temperatures after 150s. 
 
Figure  F.31. The coarse fire temperatures after 600s. 
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Figure  F.32. The medium fire temperatures after 50s. 
 
Figure  F.33. The medium fire temperatures after 150s. 
 
Figure  F.34. The medium fire temperatures after 600s. 
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Figure  F.35. The fine fire temperatures after 50s. 
 
Figure  F.36. The fine fire temperatures after 150s. 
 
Figure  F.37. The fine fire temperatures after 600s. 
 
